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Preface 
The Productivity Commission is undertaking a suite of research related to water 
reform, including the effects of expanding water trade and the management of 
environmental externalities associated with the supply and use of irrigation water. 
This research is based on the irrigation industry in the southern Murray-Darling 
Basin — where the majority of irrigation in Australia occurs. 
A foundation for this research is a detailed understanding of irrigated agriculture in 
the southern Murray-Darling Basin, including: the existing patterns of water use; 
the emerging trade in water property rights and the likely behavioural responses of 
individual irrigators to changing water prices. This paper explores the determinants 
of the elasticity of demand for irrigation water. It focuses on three main irrigated 
industries — rice, dairy and horticulture — to gain a greater understanding of the 
value that farmers place on water as an input. The paper provides detail relating to 
farm decision behaviour and biophysical production realities faced by irrigators in 
the southern Murray-Darling Basin. 
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Key points 
•  There is no single market for irrigation water in the southern Murray-Darling Basin. 
Water utility charges vary between districts. Prices of traded water (for both seasonal 
allocations and entitlements) vary temporally and spatially between irrigation districts 
(reflecting constraints to trade between irrigation districts).  
•  Demand for irrigation water is relatively unresponsive to changes in the price of 
water at relatively lower prices in the short run, but becomes more responsive at 
higher prices, and in the long run. 
•  Irrigator responsiveness depends on the total water needs of an irrigator’s crop. 
These needs are first satisfied from rainfall, then from seasonal allocations, and 
finally by purchases of traded water.  
•  Irrigator responsiveness to changes in water prices may vary substantially from year 
to year because of seasonal conditions locally and in the headwaters of the relevant 
catchment. Rainfall variability (and resultant variability of seasonal allocations) 
causes volatility in demand for, and prices of, traded irrigation water.   
•  Irrigators’ responses to changing water prices will vary because of past investment 
decisions and available substitution choices. 
–  In the short run, rice growers tend to reduce the area planted to rice in years when 
they expect relatively low seasonal allocations. Dairy farmers have more 
substitution choices, such as purchasing fodder rather than irrigating their own 
pastures. Horticulturists with perennial crops may be relatively unresponsive to 
changing seasonal prices for irrigation water, because of the cost of replanting if 
part of their crop dies.  
–  In the long run, irrigators may respond to rising water prices by adopting water 
saving technologies or by altering their mix of irrigated activities. At current prices, 
on-farm water savings alone are unlikely to justify investment in water saving 
technology. Water ‘saved’ by use of water saving technology is likely to be used to 
irrigate more land, or sold to other irrigators (in the absence of a mechanism to 
allocate it to other uses).  
– Substitution can occur between alternative irrigation activities, and between 
irrigated and non-irrigated activities. If a large number of irrigators choose to move 
from one activity to another, the change may affect commodity prices received in 
both the activity they leave (prices may go higher) and the one they enter (prices 
may go lower), and may affect land and water prices. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper examines the demand for irrigation water in major irrigation districts in 
the southern Murray-Darling Basin (MDB). The objective is to gain insights into 
how irrigators in major agricultural industries alter their use of water in the short 
and long run as utility charges and/or the market price of traded water change 
(hereafter referred to as water prices unless otherwise specified). The proportional 
change in the amount of water used, due to changes in water prices, is the price 
responsiveness or elasticity of water demand.  
Irrigators may respond to changing water prices by deciding to continue using 
existing levels of water, or to adjust their water usage. For example, Gardner (1983) 
observed that an irrigator growing a crop, such as rice or cotton, might respond to 
an increase in the price of irrigation water by: 
•  leaving land fallow and demanding less water 
•  applying less water to the crop and risking some yield loss 
•  switching to less water demanding crops 
•  investing in more efficient irrigation techniques.  
An understanding of how irrigators respond to changes in water prices can provide 
some insights into their likely responses to other economic changes, including 
reforms to the irrigation sector. It is also useful when constructing economic models 
(both quantitative and qualitative) that analyse the impacts of policy reform and that 
predict economic behaviour. If general equilibrium models, for example, are 
sufficiently disaggregated, they can be used to estimate the outcomes of economic 
and policy changes for specific regions of Australia. These models (such as TERM-
Water) require characterisations of the behaviour of important economic agents in 
each region (Wittwer 2003). Partial equilibrium models often use elasticity 
estimates. Estimates are also needed to calibrate mathematical models of producer 
behaviour that do not use empirically estimated elasticities directly. A better 
understanding and estimation of demand responsiveness will improve the analytical 
and predictive power of these models.     




1.1  Background and scope  
Irrigated agriculture represents about 28 per cent of the gross value of agricultural 
production in Australia. Approximately 2.5 million hectares of land were irrigated 
in 2000-01, a 22 per cent increase since 1996-97 (ABS 2004b). This area represents 
about 5 per cent of the land sown to crops, pastures and grasses, and about 0.5 per 
cent of land used for agriculture (ABS 2004a). 
Agriculture uses around 67 per cent of all water used in Australia (table 1.1). There 
is significant variation in the proportion of water consumed by agriculture across 
jurisdictions, ranging from around 40  per  cent in Western Australia, to over 
78 per cent for New South Wales and ACT combined. Most of the water used by 
Australian agriculture is consumed in New South Wales (44  per cent), Victoria 
(22 per cent) and Queensland (21 per cent). 
The major agricultural water consumers in 2000-01 included the ‘livestock, pasture, 
grains and other agriculture’ industry (about 33  per  cent), the cotton and dairy 
farming industries (about 17  per cent each), and the rice industry (about 12  per 
cent). The sugar and horticultural (fruit, grapes and vegetables) industries are also 
significant users.  
Table 1.1 Net  water  consumption  for selected industries a, 2000-01 
 NSW–ACT    Vic.   Qld   SA   WA   Tas.   NT   Aust.
 GL    GL   GL   GL   GL   GL   GL   GL
Livestock, pasture, grains 
and other agriculture 
2 590  1 435  779  474  176  85  30  5 568
Dairy farming  401  1 685  288  320  65  76  –  2 834
Vegetables   96  131  103  65  111  49  1  556
Fruit  214  209  107  161 65 10 36  803
Grapes 174  238  6  284  23  1  3  729
Sugar  1  –  1 186  –  124  –  –  1 311
Cotton   1 921  –  985  –  3  –  –  2 908
Rice   1 924  27  –  –  –  –  –  1 951
Total for agriculture b  7 322  3 725  3 454  1 302  565  222  70  16 660
Total for Australia  9 425  7 140  4 711  1 647  1 409  417  160  24 909
a Net water consumption = mains water use + self-extracted water use – mains water supply. Excluding 
in-stream use. b Columns may not add to total because of rounding. 
Source: ABS (2004b). 
Irrigation water is used by irrigators to supplement rainfall in their agricultural 
production systems. In most cases, the local rainfall in regions where irrigation is 
located is insufficient for current  farming practices to be sustained without 
irrigation. For example, in a typical season, a rice crop in southern New South     
  INTRODUCTION  3 
 
Wales needs 13 megalitres of irrigation water per hectare in addition to average 
rainfall during the growing season — the equivalent of adding 1300 millimetres to 
the annual regional rainfall of about 400–450 millimetres (NSW Agriculture 2003). 
Irrigation water can be sourced by irrigators in a variety of ways, including: 
•  on-farm storage and diversion of surface water flows across farms 
•  on-farm pumping and diversion of ground water 
•  diversion of water from on-farm water courses 
•  via major storage, diversion and delivery infrastructure managed by public and 
private utilities — sometimes referred to as supplemented irrigation schemes. 
The focus in this paper is on the last. Irrigation schemes are concentrated in the 
eastern states of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland and draw water from 
Great Dividing Range catchments (figure 1.1).  
Figure 1.1  Major irrigation areas in Australia, 1997 
 
 
Data source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 1997 data used in NLWRA (2001). 
Over 70 per cent of irrigation water use occurs within the MDB, with most 
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irrigated farms in the southern MDB are grouped within discrete irrigation districts 
located in the valleys of the Murrumbidgee, Murray, and Goulburn rivers. 
Diversions of water from rivers supplying these districts represent around 70 per 
cent of all diversions in the MDB (MDBC 2003, p. 7). 
Figure 1.2  Major irrigation districts in the Murray-Darling Basin 
 
Data source: Murray-Darling Basin Commission. 
Major irrigation districts include the Goulburn-Murray Water (GMW) district in 
northern Victoria (which can be subdivided into the Goulburn (GV) and Victorian     
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Murray (VM) districts), the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area (MIA) and the Murray 
Irrigation (MI) and Coleambally Irrigation (CI) districts in southern New South 
Wales. These districts account for over 85 per cent of water entitlements in the 
southern MDB (table 1.2). Several smaller irrigation districts located along the 
Murray river, between Swan Hill in Victoria and Murray Bridge in South Australia, 
encompass the ‘Sunraysia’ and ‘Riverland’ districts.  
Table 1.2  Irrigation scheme entitlements in the southern Murray-Darling 
Basin, 2001-02 
Irrigation company  Entitlement 
  ML
New South Wales   
 Coleambally Irrigation  632 000 
 Murray Irrigation Limited  1 450 000 
 Murrumbidgee Irrigation  1 200 000 
 Western Murray Irrigation  61 000 
 West Corurgan Irrigation  78 000 
Victoria   
 First Mildura Irrigation Trust  85 055 
 Goulburn-Murray Water  1 600 000 
 Sunraysia Rural Water Authority  301 273 
South Australia   
 Central Irrigation Trust  120 000 
 Renmark Irrigation Trust  49 000 
Source: Hassall & Associates in association with Musgrave (2002). 
For an irrigator within the southern MDB, there are three broad ‘types’ of irrigation 
water supplied by utilities: 
•  Water entitlements: an irrigator’s access rights to a specific quantity of water 
each irrigation season. In New South Wales, entitlements are either classified as 
having ‘high’ or ‘general’ supply reliability. South Australia and Victoria 
provide only one class of entitlement (which has high supply reliability). In all 
three states, the reliability of supply can differ between irrigation districts. If an 
entitlement is traded, it is sometimes called permanent water. 
•  Seasonal allocations: proportion of an irrigator’s water entitlement allocated by 
water utilities during an irrigation season — allocations may be less than 
100 per cent, equal to 100 per cent, or more than 100 per cent (see Sales water) 
of nominal entitlement. If a seasonal allocation is traded, it is sometimes called 
temporary water. 
•  Sales water (Victoria) and Supplementary water (New South Wales): in some 
years, individual water utilities may have ‘excess’ water available after all other 
needs (including environmental flows and maintaining reserves) have been met.     




This water is made available to irrigators on the same basis as seasonal 
allocations. The right to access sales or supplementary water is proportional to 
each irrigator’s water entitlement. For example, each irrigator may be able to 
access sales (or supplementary) water of up to 30 per cent of their entitlement. 
1.2 Determinants  of  water  demand 
Water is one of many inputs into agricultural production. As a productive input, it is 
valued for its contribution to farm outputs, rather than as a commodity for final 
consumption. 
The relationships between irrigation farm inputs are complex and seldom linear. 
Some inputs are essentially fixed in the short run (such as land), while others are 
variable (such as fertilisers). Because some inputs are fixed, at some point 
diminishing returns occur such that the continued addition of variable inputs 
eventually yields smaller and smaller additional units of output. 
There may be interactions between inputs. Complementary relationships between 
inputs are common in agriculture — applications of one input (such as fertiliser) are 
best matched with increased applications of other inputs (such as water). 
Substitution possibilities may exist between water and other inputs — the use of 
water-saving irrigation schedules requires more labour. Some input use may be 
independent of the application of other inputs, such as applying trace elements to 
soils that are deficient in them. Given these interrelationships, the demand for water, 
or any other input, cannot be described without reference to the additional inputs 
being used.  
Overall, the demand for water is derived from: 
•  its price  
•  its contribution to production. This depends on the prices of all inputs (which 
determine the optimal quantities to use) 
•  the prices of outputs (which determine the optimal quantities to produce). 
If a demand curve for water is presented for a given level of other inputs, changes in 
the price of water will lead to movement along the demand curve. Changes in 
output prices, or in the prices and use of other interdependent inputs, will lead to 
shifts of the demand curve for water.     
  INTRODUCTION  7 
 
Time frame of irrigators’ responses 
It is usual to classify farmers’ responses to changing circumstances into different 
periods for analysis (box 1.1). The purpose of these periods is to simplify the 
discussion of possible responses, and to allow responses using similar resources to 
be considered together. They do not imply that irrigators’ responses to changing 
circumstances will follow a hierarchical order.  
Brennan (pers. comm., 9 June 2004) observed that the timing of irrigators’ 
responses will be determined by many factors, and will be influenced by farm 
specific characteristics — for example, the age and condition of assets and the 
financial position of farmers. The pace of industry adjustment will reflect the many 
and varied responses at the farm level. 
 
Box 1.1  Defining the short and long run 
In the short run, at least one input can be varied while other resources are fixed. 
Importantly, in the short run, production decisions are assumed to be fixed and the mix 
of activities on the farm cannot be changed. Short run responses occur during a 
production season — for example, a marginal change in water applications.  
In the long run, all inputs can be varied, including the amount and location of land 
owned and capital employed, all prices received and paid, and choice of activities. 
Long run responses can occur over many production seasons — for example, 
investing in new irrigation technology. 
Source: Doll and Orazem (1984, p.27). 
 
 
1.3  Measuring the responsiveness of water demand  
The change in the amount of water demanded, due to changes in price, is measured 
by price elasticity. It is likely that elasticities for water demand will vary over space, 
time and between irrigators — consequently there is no single elasticity of demand 
for irrigation water.  
The own-price elasticity of demand is the percentage change in quantity demanded 
that results from a one per  cent change in price (box  1.2). Irrigators have an 
incentive to reduce the quantity of water demanded if the price of water rises, 
therefore, own-price elasticities are negative. An elasticity is measured at a 
specified level of price or quantity, and will generally be different at other prices 
and quantities (Tomek and Robinson 1981):     




•  Between –1 and minus infinity, demand is said to be relatively elastic. That is, 
quantity demanded responds by more than the proportionate change in price. In 
such a case, the irrigator’s expenditure on water will fall as the price rises.  
•  Between zero and –1, demand is said to be relatively inelastic. That is, the 
quantity demanded, responds by less than the proportionate change in price. In 
such a case, the farmer’s expenditure on water will increase in response to an 
increase in price even though their consumption of water has fallen. 
 
Box 1.2  Determining the elasticity of demand 
Elasticity (ε) is calculated by considering a percentage change in price, and the 
percentage change in quantity demanded that results from the price change (equation 
below). It can be seen that the elasticity of an arc segment of the demand curve 
depends on its slope and relative position in the price-quantity space diagram (a).  
a) 



















The elasticity of demand can vary along different segments of the demand curve. Even 
if the slope is constant, the position of the curve affects the magnitude of the 
proportional change (diagram b) — the further along the quantity axis, the smaller the 
relative change in quantity and hence the less elastic is demand. The elasticity will also 
vary as the slope changes — at a given point, a flatter curve is more elastic than a 
steeper one (diagram c). 








In most empirical studies, elasticity is estimated as the arc elasticity. It is more difficult 
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For ease of discussion, economists often refer to ‘elastic’ or ‘inelastic’ demand 
curves. This is a simplification because elasticities are typically valid only for 
narrow ranges of prices. Elasticities vary with the slope and position of a demand 
curve. For a given linear demand curve, demand is more elastic the higher the price; 
and as the demand curve moves further from the axis, for every given price, the 
quantities demanded are larger and demand becomes less elastic.  
The slope of the demand curve is determined by the availability of options that 
allow substitution away from water and the impact of rising water prices on the 
viability of the farm. For example, low substitutability and a low share of total costs 
can lead to inelastic water demand.  
Movements of a demand curve will occur due to technological changes in 
production methods (investment in capital, such as more efficient irrigation 
systems), changes in crops mix and the quantity of water used by types of crop 
(application rates). 
Consequently, elasticities of demand for irrigation water are likely to vary: 
•  between different price levels for a given demand curve 
•  between the different types of water users, including irrigators and industries 
•  over time as individual irrigators’ demand for water changes between the short 
and long run, becoming more elastic. 
1.4  Outline of the paper 
In chapter 2, the factors underlying demand for irrigation water are described and 
key features of utility charges and trade prices are summarised. In chapter 3, 
attempts to estimate the price responsiveness of irrigators are reviewed and 
qualitative insights from economic theory on irrigators’ price responsiveness are 
introduced. These insights are extended in chapters 4, 5 and 6 to consider the 
responsiveness in the short and long run. Appendix A summarises previous 
Australian studies.     
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2 Understanding  irrigator demand and 
water prices 
This chapter discusses factors underlying demand for irrigation water by individual 
irrigators. In section 2.1, physical influences on irrigators’ use of irrigation water 
are reviewed. The relationships between water demand, plant needs, rainfall, and 
type of farming enterprise are discussed. An overview of trade in irrigation water is 
provided in section 2.2. The importance of seasonal conditions in determining 
demand for irrigation water and water trade is discussed in section 2.3. In section 
2.4, charges and prices of irrigation water are summarised. 
2.1  Physical factors influencing use of irrigation water 
Use of irrigation water during an irrigation season is influenced by the difference 
between the optimal water input for an irrigator’s crops and rainfall during the 
growing season.  
Rainfall in the southern Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) varies significantly both 
within and between years. In this paper, four stylised seasonal types are used for 
illustrative purposes: 
•  Typical seasons: Irrigation seasons an irrigator would consider ‘typical’ or 
‘normal’ for their district; rainfall would be similar to average rainfall. 
•  Wetter seasons: Irrigation seasons where rainfall is significantly greater than in 
typical seasons. In wetter seasons, too much rain may reduce farm production.  
•  Drier seasons: Irrigation seasons where rainfall is less than in a typical season, 
but not exceptionally so.  
•  Very dry seasons: Irrigation seasons where rainfall is in the bottom decile of 
expectations. 
While there is considerable variability in rainfall within an irrigation season (for 
example, a ‘dry’ spring being followed by a ‘typical’ summer and a ‘wetter’ 
autumn), a further simplifying assumption in this paper is that the stylised irrigation 
seasons have uniform seasonal conditions (for example, a wetter irrigation season 
has a wetter spring, summer, and autumn). For ease of exposition, it is also assumed    




that seasonal conditions in an irrigation district corresponds with those in the 
relevant catchment. 
Rainfall variability and plant water needs 
The amount of irrigation water required by an irrigator in a particular season is the 
difference between the water requirements of the irrigator’s irrigated activities, and 
local rainfall during the growing season. Other things being equal, an irrigator will 
use less irrigation water in relatively wetter years, and more irrigation water in 
relatively drier years (figure 2.1).  
For most irrigated agricultural activities in the southern MDB, rainfall over a 
growing season is less than the quantity of water needed by the plants. As a result, 
most existing irrigated activities could not exist in these regions without irrigation. 









a The line representing plant needs for water slopes upwards because drier and very dry years typically have 
temperatures higher than average. Higher temperatures will increase plant needs for water by increasing 
transpiration and evaporation. Higher temperatures initially increase plant growth, but once temperatures 
exceed a threshold, plant growth may then diminish (for example, see Richards, Bange and Milroy (2003) for a 
discussion of the impact on high temperatures on cotton plants). 
A feature of rainfall in the southern MDB is its variability. For example, there was 
sufficient rainfall during the decade 1988 to 1997 to allow GMW to provide 
seasonal allocations of 200  per cent of entitlement (100  per cent sales water) to 
irrigators in each year. In contrast, there have been relatively dry seasons since 1998 
— allocations were reduced to 120 per cent in 1998 (utilising water stored from the 
previous year) and thereafter to 100 per cent. In 2002-03 allocations were 57 per 
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In general, the need for irrigation water in the southern MDB is greatest in the 
summer, followed by spring and autumn. However, because rainfall can be highly 
variable during an irrigation season, the seasonal pattern of need for irrigation water 
is also variable. In any irrigation season, there can be periods without rain and 
irrigation can be the main, even sole, source of water for the crop. Equally, there 
may be periods and places where rainfall is sufficient to meet all the short term 
water requirements, and irrigation may not be required. In periods of very high 
rainfall, too much water can be limiting to production, since (among other things) 
too much water (either from rain or irrigation) may lead to soil water logging 
(figure 2.2).  









Reliability of supply of irrigation water and risk 
The limit on the amount of water potentially available for use in irrigation schemes 
in a catchment is the amount of runoff into tributaries to the main stream, less 
system losses and allocations to other users (such as urban and environmental uses). 
Major irrigation schemes enable the consumption of rain water on land downstream 
of where it fell. One reason for making such a transfer is that the downstream land 
may be more suited to profitable agricultural activities than the land where the 
runoff occurred. 
Another reason for undertaking irrigated activities is to reduce risks associated with 
variable rainfall. Compared to neighbouring dryland farmers, irrigators have access 
to more water, and access to water for periods within a year when there is no 
rainfall. After the introduction of an irrigation scheme, farmers tend to change their 
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An important purpose of storing water in a reservoir is to deliver water to irrigators 
when they require it. If all the irrigation water is released from storage in a year, 
storage does not affect the total amount of water that can be used for irrigation 
within that year (ignoring evaporation, seepage and transmission losses). If an 
irrigation scheme is administered so that no water is held over between irrigation 
seasons (such as for some NSW irrigation water), then there is likely to be 
considerable variability in the allocations made available to irrigators each year. 
Most rainfall in the catchments of the southern MDB irrigation schemes occurs in 
winter and spring. This means that irrigators can obtain information about likely 
seasonal allocations relatively early in the production season, and may be able to 
adjust their production decisions to match expected allocations. As noted earlier, 
most existing irrigated agricultural activities in the southern MDB could not exist 
without irrigation. Changing activities changes the nature of the risks associated 
with variable rainfall. Dryland farmers face the risks of having insufficient rain to 
plant crops; and, once a crop is planted, of having insufficient rain for the crop to 
grow to maturity. As a rule, a season where rainfall is insufficient to allow crop 
planting has fewer adverse financial consequences than seasons where crops are 
planted and then fail — because the variable costs of planting and tending the crop 
are not incurred. In contrast, an irrigator matching plantings to announced seasonal 
allocations faces less risk of crop failure, but still has variability in plantings. 
The annual reliability of the supply of irrigation water can be changed by forgoing 
the consumption in one year, and storing it for future years. For example, GMW’s 
objective is to deliver the full allocation in 97 years in a 100. To achieve this 
objective, available irrigation water is released until the full allocation is delivered. 
Once that is delivered, no more irrigation water is made available until GMW is 
confident that it can deliver the following year’s full allocation. Over-allocation or 
‘sales’ water is then made available. This approach delivers a high reliability of 
supply. GMW has only failed to deliver the full allocation once (in 2002-03). Some 
irrigators are likely to respond to the increased supply reliability and reduced risk by 
planting perennial crops that have relatively inflexible requirements for water. In 
doing so, they increase their exposure to risk in the years when the utility is unable 
to deliver the full seasonal allocation.  
The influence of farming enterprises  
The amount of water required by irrigators will also be influenced by the nature of 
their farming activities. Annual croppers may purchase irrigation water to plant a 
crop in years when the water is likely to be available at relatively low prices. 
However, in years when the water price is relatively high (or when seasonal 
allocations are relatively low) they may reduce (or even forgo) the area planted to     
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irrigated annual crops, using their land for some other purpose. In contrast, 
irrigators growing perennial horticultural crops, with long lags between planting and 
harvesting, are likely to use sufficient water to keep plants alive — provided the 
cost of buying irrigation water is less than the cost of replanting and nurturing them 
to the same maturity.  
2.2  Water trade  
The demand for irrigation water is complicated by the fact that irrigators can also 
supply irrigation water to other irrigators. They can sell part, or all, of their seasonal 
allocation or their underlying water entitlement. For example, an irrigator growing 
annual crops may choose not to plant a crop for a year if the expected returns from 
trading allocations, and alternative land uses, exceeds the expected return from the 
irrigated crop. 
Uncertainty about future rainfall and the supply of irrigation water means that some 
irrigators may choose to hold a greater water entitlement than required in a typical 
year as a means of reducing risk. For example, a risk averse irrigator growing 
perennial horticultural crops may choose to hold a larger water entitlement than 
needed to meet plant water needs in a typical year as ‘insurance’ for seasons when 
the water utility is unable to provide the full water entitlement. In years when the 
full water entitlement is available, the irrigator could choose to trade any ‘excess’ 
irrigation water to other irrigators. In New South Wales, horticulturists are likely to 
hold high security water entitlements as an alternative means of managing risk. The 
majority of annual croppers (including rice growers) in New South Wales hold 
general security water entitlements. 
Importantly, annual croppers and horticulturists are likely to demand, or supply, 
irrigation water at different times.  
•  The annual cropper is likely to demand irrigation water when prices are 
relatively low — typically wetter years. They may supply irrigation water when 
prices are relatively high — typically drier years.  
•  The perennial horticulturist is likely to supply irrigation water in wetter years 
and demand it in drier years (also see Freebairn 2004).  
Individual irrigators’ decisions to supply water may also be affected by their 
relative endowments of water — individual irrigators have differing water 
entitlements, seasonal allocations and access to other water sources (such as 
overland flows, passing flows for water courses and storm drains, and 
groundwater). Soils, management skills and farming intensity, among other things, 
may also affect their ability or willingness to supply water.     




2.3  Seasonal conditions and trade 
Important factors to be considered when analysing supply and demand of traded 
seasonal allocations include: 
•  quantities and prices of the water traded 
•  characteristics of the district(s) in which trade occurred 
•  seasonal conditions under which trade occurred 
•  market conditions for produce. 
Supply and demand relationships differ between irrigation areas. For example, in 
some irrigation districts (such as the GMW district), most of the available water 
entitlement is utilised every year. This means that an irrigator can acquire more 
water, supplied by a utility, only through trade with other irrigators.  
Seasonal supply and demand of traded irrigation water are linked, and will vary 
according to seasonal conditions. Irrigators’ demand for irrigation water depends on 
local seasonal conditions, while the ability of a water utility to supply irrigation 
water depends on seasonal conditions in the headwaters of the relevant 
catchment(s). The size of the southern MDB means seasonal conditions may vary 
between irrigation districts.  
The demand for traded allocations under different seasonal conditions, for general 
security water in New South Wales, is stylised in figure 2.3. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that similar seasonal conditions apply in both the headwaters of the 
catchment and locally within each of the four scenarios, and that storage constraints 
allow sales or supplementary water to be allocated only in wetter years. The impact 
of wetter, typical, dry and very dry irrigation seasons on the supply and demand for 
traded irrigation water are discussed in the following scenarios. 
Wetter seasons 
Above average rainfall in an irrigation season can meet a substantial portion of 
some irrigators’ water needs (but rarely all) — and there is also a higher probability 
of sales or supplementary water being available in those years. As a result, many 
irrigators will use less than average quantities of irrigation water. They are likely to 
source their irrigation water first from their seasonal allocation, then from ‘sales’ or 
‘supplementary’ water, and finally from traded allocations. Some irrigators may 
find that their needs are less than their seasonal allocation, and may attempt to trade 
‘excess’ water. In such years, there is likely to be a relatively low demand for traded 
allocations, but a relatively high supply. Accordingly, prices for traded allocations 
in wetter seasons are likely to be relatively low.      
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Figure 2.3  Stylised impact of seasonal conditions on aggregate demand 












a This example assumes that there is no ‘carryover’ of water between irrigation seasons. In Victoria, carryover 
of water between seasons may mean that ‘sales’ water can be available in typical and drier years. 
Typical seasons 
In typical irrigation seasons, when conditions are such that seasonal allocations are 
fully met and sales or supplementary water is available, more irrigators may wish to 
supplement their seasonal allocation with the purchase of traded allocations. 
However, the same seasonal conditions are likely to decrease supply as irrigators 
who could make traded allocations available in wetter seasons may need to use 
more for their own needs. As a result, prices for traded allocations are likely to be 
relatively higher in typical seasons than in wetter seasons. 
Drier seasons 
In drier irrigation seasons, there is also a higher probability that sales or 
supplementary water will be unavailable. If there is little, or no, sales or 
supplementary water available, the demand for traded allocations will increase. 
Again, supply may be lower than in either wetter or typical seasons. As a result, the 
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price of traded allocations will be higher, with the price rise moderated by an 
increase in the supply of traded allocations as some irrigators find that they can 
obtain a higher return by trading their water (and using their land for alternative 
activities). 
Very dry seasons 
In very dry irrigation seasons (like 2002-03 in the southern MDB) there is little 
rainfall, and water utilities may be unable to deliver the full water entitlement. In 
these years, there will be strong competition for traded allocations. Most irrigators 
with perennial pastures or crops will seek to purchase traded allocations to augment 
their reduced seasonal allocation. The supply of traded allocations is likely to come 
from irrigators engaged in annual cropping who find that the relatively high prices 
offered for traded allocations will offer a higher return than attempting to crop with 
reduced water supplies.  
2.4  Irrigation water charges and prices 
Utilities charge irrigators for seasonal allocations and deliveries to the farm. Prior to 
water trade emerging, utility charges were the price of water to an irrigator. Trade in 
seasonal allocations and water entitlements has lead to premiums for water above 
utility charges and has revealed opportunity costs for water that differ from the 
utility charge (box 2.1).  
 
Box 2.1  The opportunity cost of seasonal allocations 
An irrigator who holds a water entitlement is entitled to receive a seasonal allocation of 
water, and has an obligation to pay water utility charges. One ‘price’ of the water 
received is the water utility charge. 
Another ‘price’ is the opportunity cost of water. Doll and Orazem (1984, p.  82) 
observed that: 
Every resource used in the production process has but one true cost: its opportunity 
cost. The opportunity cost of a resource is the return the resource can earn when 
put to its best alternative use. Suppose (an irrigator has a megalitre of water). 
Suppose further that (trading the water) will add $150 to his total revenue …, but 
spreading it on his field will add $100 to his total revenue. If he (waters his field) his 
opportunity cost is $150; he has foregone $150 to earn $100. The most return from 
a unit of input is realised when the actual earned return is equal to or greater than 
the opportunity cost. 
If an irrigator chooses to trade water, their financial position is improved if the price of 
traded allocations is higher than the return from using it on the farm.     
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Utility charges are designed primarily to recover the operational, maintenance and 
some capital costs associated with supply activities including harvesting, storage, 
diversions and delivery. In most districts, utilities charge irrigators a two-part tariff 
consisting of: 
•  a fixed component — a charge based on the volume of an irrigator’s water 
entitlement  
•  a variable component — a charge on either the volume of water allocated or 
volume delivered during the irrigation season (see table 2.1). 
Utility charges in the GMW, MI and MIA districts 
For many utilities, supply charges are based primarily on the volume of the water 
entitlement rather than the consumption of water by irrigators. Some utilities have a 
variety of charges within the fixed and variable components. When a trade in 
seasonal allocations occurs, the seller is responsible for the fixed charges related to 
the traded entitlement. The variable or volume related charges are paid by the buyer 
of the water (DNRE 2001). 
Utility charges for irrigation water are likely to be higher in pumped districts. Some 
smaller irrigation districts are supplied with pumped water — whereas all of the 
subdistricts in the MI and MIA districts and most of the subdistricts in the GMW 
district are supplied via a gravity delivery system.  
For gravity delivery in the GMW district, irrigators pay a fixed fee comprising two 
components — an entitlement storage fee and an infrastructure access fee. Irrigators 
also pay variable usage fees.  
In the MI district, irrigators are charged a fixed entitlement storage and 
infrastructure access fee as well as other fixed fees which include drainage charges 
and Land and Water Management Plan charges. A variable usage fee is also 
charged as well as a volume based drainage charge. 
In the MIA, charges consist of a fixed charge comprising water (entitlement) 
storage and access to infrastructure, and a usage charge for water supply. These 
charges are separated for high security (used mainly for perennial plantings) water 
and general or low security (used mainly for annual crops) water (Murrumbidgee 
Irrigation, pers. comm., 21 January 2004). The charging structures of the three 
utilities are summarised in table 2.1.     









Entitlement storage and 
infrastructure access fees 
 
Other fixed fees 
 
Usage fees 
    $/ML of entitlement  $/ML of entitlement  $/ML delivered
GMW  ‘Water right’  19.25–29.37b —  5.62–11.05
MI  ‘General security’  7.10  0.51-2.72c
0.28-1.12d
8.50–9.72e
        ‘General security’  6.15  n/a  12.40 MIA 
‘High security’  9.89  n/a  29.00
a The total cost per megalitre of water delivered may not be calculated by adding the rows horizontally in 
years when the seasonal allocations are different to the entitlement. b  Fixed charges levied in the GMW 
district for gravity delivery vary across subdistricts. c Fixed drainage charge. d Land and Water Management 
Plan fixed charges. e  Includes variable drainage charges. 
Sources: Goulburn-Murray Water, pers. comm., 1 April 2004; MI, pers. comm., 16 April 2004; MIA, pers. 
comm., 7 and 27 April 2004. 
The price of traded seasonal allocations 
Understanding the market for seasonal allocations is useful when considering 
irrigators’ responses to changes in prices and charges. Trade volumes can be large 
and prices can differ significantly from utility charges. Prices paid for traded 
seasonal allocations vary from irrigation district to irrigation district, and irrigation 
season to irrigation season.  
The market for seasonal allocations is well developed and active in some areas, but 
almost non-existent in others. For example, during 2002-03 about 5500 irrigators in 
the GV purchased about 153 gigalitres, and about 6300 irrigators sold about 133 
gigalitres — with around 20 gigalitres of allocations imported from other irrigation 
districts. The volume of water traded was about 20 per cent of total usage for the 
year (GMW 2003). However, there are some (relatively small) trading regions 
within the irrigation district where no trading was recorded.  
As a rule, when seasonal allocations are traded, the volume of water purchased is 
the same as the volume sold (‘a megalitre is a megalitre’) irrespective of where the 
water is acquired from, or the nature of the underlying entitlement. However, there 
are exceptions which reflect transmission losses. For example, an exchange rate of 
0.85 applies to water purchased by MI irrigators from GMW irrigators — if a GMW 
vendor sells 100 megalitres, the MI purchaser pays for 100 megalitres, but is only 
delivered 85 megalitres. There is also an exchange rate of 0.95 for all seasonal 
allocations traded to South Australia.     
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In each year, the market for seasonal allocations is likely to reflect the allocation 
decisions of the relevant water utility, and seasonal conditions in both the 
headwaters of the catchment, and locally. For example, Brennan (2004, p. 14) 
highlights that the price of traded allocations is closely related to the percentage of 
seasonal allocation delivered by the utility. High prices for traded allocations 
correspond to seasons when allocations are low and lower prices with seasons when 
allocations are fully met. 
Spatial variation 
The markets for traded allocations in each major irrigation district appear to be 
heterogenous spatially, with the prices paid in any week differing markedly between 
districts (figure 2.4). For example, between 2000-01 and 2002-03, the prices paid in 
the Greater Goulburn subdistrict of the GMW district were higher than prices paid 
in the MI trading district and in the MIA.  
Figure 2.4  Average weekly prices per megalitre for traded allocations in 
























a  Average weekly pooled price per megalitre; MIA price for 2000-01 is a yearly average. b GMW data for the 
Greater Goulburn subdistrict. c MIA data for 2001-02 were not available.  
Data sources: Goulburn-Murray Water, pers. comm., 1 December 2003; MI, pers. comm., 22 December 2003; 
MIA, pers. comm., 2 February 2004.    




Prices differ because various constraints impede the trade of irrigation water from 
one irrigation district to another. For example, irrigation water cannot be traded 
directly between the Greater Goulburn subdistrict of the GMW district, and the MI 
and MIA districts (see box 2.2). 
 
Box 2.2  Restrictions on trade of seasonal allocations 
Trade of seasonal allocations between different irrigation districts can be limited by 
regulations, physical and ‘market based‘ constraints. 
Regulations constraining trade can occur within and between irrigation districts. For 
example, the New South Wales Water Allocation Plan 2003–2004 for the Murray and 
Lower Darling valleys provided: 
Due to the low water availability in both the Murray and Murrumbidgee River valleys at the 
start of the 2003–2004 seasons, there will be no temporary (annual) trades between these 
valleys. This restriction may be relaxed with a significant improvement in available water 
resources. (DIPNR 2003, p. 14) 
Similarly, GMW does not permit the trade of more than 30 per cent of an irrigator’s 
sales water. If GMW irrigators trade sales water, their total use and trade of sales water 
is restricted to 30 per cent. MI applies an exchange rate of 0.85 on each megalitre 
bought from GMW irrigators.  
Direct trade is also prohibited between certain trading subdistricts within an irrigation 
district and from certain trading districts within an irrigation district to other irrigation 
districts. For example, irrigators in the Greater Goulburn subdistrict are not permitted to 
trade directly with irrigators from the MI district and vice versa.  
The extent to which regulatory constraints on trades of seasonal allocations reflect 
hydrological limitations is unclear. For example, while the MIA is located on a different 
river to the MI and GMW districts, all districts source water from the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme, and deliver water to the Murray. The hydrological links of these districts are 
sufficient to enable trade. Important hydrological considerations are capacity 
constraints of the supply and delivery system. For example, each trade has to be 
approved by the utility to ensure that the delivery can be met without affecting either 
the environment or the allocation deliveries of other irrigators. In the case of the 
Barmah Choke, a natural flow constraint, water trades are prevented from districts 
above the choke to districts below. 
In some irrigation districts, water use standards apply that penalise irrigators for 
exceeding certain irrigation volumes per hectare during an irrigation season. In 
addition, some irrigation districts along the Murray River, between Nyah and the South 
Australian border, have been designated high and low salinity impact zones and 
regulations preventing trade into high impact zones.  
‘Market based’ constraints include differing supply reliabilities and tenures of tradeable 
water, and a lack of information on trade opportunities in some markets (particularly for 
entitlements).            
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The 2002-03 irrigation season was relatively dry in all irrigation districts in the 
southern MDB, and seasonal allocations were reduced. For example, allocations 
were 57 per cent in the Goulburn Valley district. Seasonal allocations were even 
lower for general security water in New South Wales — just 8 per cent in the MI 
district. Some New South Wales irrigators were also able to use irrigation water 
they had ‘carried over’ (not used) in the previous year. 
Prices paid for traded allocations in the MI district during the 2002-03 irrigation 
season may reflect the greater importance of dairy and horticulture in that area 
compared to the MIA, but the lesser importance of those activities compared to the 
Greater Goulburn trading subdistrict. Irrigated agriculture in the Greater Goulburn 
trading subdistrict is dominated by dairy, with significant perennial horticulture 
industries, such as fruits and wine grapes, and comparatively less annual cropping 
and mixed farming enterprises. Further, there were few substitutes for irrigation 
water for horticulturists who faced large costs if they allowed their plants to die. For 
dairy farmers, the main substitute for irrigation water — purchased fodder — was 
also relatively expensive that year. As a result, there was a high demand for traded 
allocations in the irrigation area — as both major irrigated activities sought to meet 
the shortfall in their seasonal allocations. 
In contrast, annual crops (such as rice) are significant agricultural activities in the 
MIA. Irrigators have the flexibility to match their plantings of crops to the expected 
supply of irrigation water. In 2002-03, many irrigators in the MIA chose to reduce 
their plantings significantly, knowing they were likely to receive small seasonal 
allocations, and that the values of their allocations were likely to be high if sold. 
Brennan (2004) notes that price differentials for traded allocations also exist 
between trading zones where there are no legal barriers to trade. The differential is 
attributed to trading rules which require a seller to nominate which trading zones 
they wish to sell in. Brennan suggests that there would be efficiency gains by 
removing these rules. 
Temporal variation 
As well as spatial variation, there are also wide variations in prices of traded 
allocations within an irrigation district both during and between irrigation seasons 
(figure 2.4). 
The variation of prices of traded seasonal allocations within and between irrigation 
seasons was most apparent in the 2002-03 season when allocations were reduced 
due to drought and consequent low storages. For example, in the Greater Goulburn 
subdistrict, the average weekly price of seasonal allocations was about $360 per 
megalitre over the 2002-03 season (table 2.2). This can be compared to prices under    




$60 per megalitre between 1999-2000 and 2000-01 when allocations averaged 
above 90 per cent. In fact, the price increases over time have been so large that the 
first decile price paid in the 2001-02 and 2002-03 irrigation seasons exceeded the 
ninth decile price paid in the respective previous seasons. 
Table 2.2  Average prices for traded allocations Greater Goulburn trade 
subdistrict, 1999-2000 to 2002-03 a 
 1999-2000  2000-01  2001-02  2002-03 
  $/ML  $/ML  $/ML  $/ML 
Average weekly price  55  34 102  360 
Median weekly price  58  34 82 369 
9th decile weekly price  90  41 161  480 
1st decile weekly price  13  19 46 230 
a Prices rounded to nearest dollar. 2003-04 average not calculated due to incomplete data. 
Sources: Watermove (2004);  Goulburn-Murray Water, pers. comm., 1 December 2003; Goulburn-Murray 
Water (2003); PC estimates. 
Prices of water entitlements 
The MDBC has initiated a Pilot Interstate Water Trading Project, but there have 
been few interstate trades (box 2.3). 
 
Box 2.3  MDBC’s Pilot Interstate Water Trading Project 
This pilot scheme restricts trade to private diverters (not group irrigation schemes) in 
the Mallee Region — the Murray River between Nyah and the mouth of the Murray. 
The table below shows that only 2 trades occurred to transfer water out of South 
Australia (one each to Victoria and New South Wales). In contrast, 104 entitlement 
trades transferred over 15  000 megalitres into South Australia. About half of this 
volume was transferred from each of New South Wales and Victoria. 
Number and volume of entitlement trades by origin and destination (ML) 
September 1998 to February 2004 
 Origin    Destination  Total   
     NSW  Vic  SA     
  New South Wales  vol.  –  271.0  7 070.0  7 341.0   
   no.  –  2  47  49   
  Victoria  vol.  1 619.5  –  8 084.6  9 704.1   
   no.  24  –  57  81   
  South Australia  vol.  100.0  2 182.0  –  2 282.0   
   no.  1  1  –  2   
  Total  vol.  1 719.5  2 453.0  15 154.6  19 327.0   
   no.  25  3  104  132   
Source: Murray-Darling Basin Commission, pers. comm., 26 February 2004. 
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Within states, the majority of net entitlement trades tend to occur within, rather than 
between, trade districts (DNRE 2001; Bjornlund 2001). In Victoria, the volume of 
transfers of entitlements has increased gradually since trading commenced in   
1990-91, although it remains significantly less than the volume of trade in seasonal 
allocations. A substantial proportion of early trades of entitlements involved the sale 
of previously unused (or ‘sleeper’) licenses (DNRE 2001). Between 1990-91 and 
2000-01, a volume equal to 6 per cent of the total entitlements of farmers in 
Victoria was transferred. Entitlement trades are currently averaging about 1 per cent 
(25  000  megalitres) of total entitlements per year. In 2000-01, the average 
entitlement trade was 65 megalitres (DNRE  2001). Further, there is anecdotal 
evidence that some trades in seasonal allocations are occurring on a longer term 
basis with some irrigators negotiating agreements for more than one irrigation 
season. 
Prices of entitlements: 
•  are significantly higher than the price for seasonal allocations because 
entitlements buy a stream of future allocations, including the current allocation 
or the remaining portion thereof.  
•  differ across irrigation districts, partly as a result of the differing rights attached 
to the entitlements. The prices of water entitlements from the GMW district, for 
example, are substantially higher than in the MI district, because of differing 
supply reliabilities and attached conditions. 
•  vary spatially. The relatively thin market and confidential nature of many 
entitlement trades mean that there is little publicly available information about 
the prices being paid. Further, the differing supply reliabilities of irrigation water 
in different irrigation districts make comparison difficult. 
DNRE (2001) note that prices of traded entitlements have increased over time in 
nominal and real terms. In 1993-94, 12 000 megalitres of Sunraysia entitlements 
were sold at auction for about $440 per megalitre, mainly to Sunraysia buyers. In  
1999-2000, Sunraysia prices reached $1000 per megalitre.  
Figure 2.5 shows a time series of entitlement prices in the Greater Goulburn 
subdistrict of the GMW district and the MI district. Prices for entitlements tend to 
be more stable than prices for seasonal allocations but there was an increase in 
nominal prices during the 2002-03 drought. One explanation for the increase during 
that year was that attached seasonal allocations were trading at relatively high prices 
(up to $500 per megalitre).    




Figure 2.5  Average monthly prices for trade in water entitlements, 

















Data sources: Goulburn-Murray Water, pers. comm., 1 April 2004; Murray Irrigation Limited, pers. comm.., 
22 December 2003. 
The slow emergence of the entitlement market and the relatively low volumes and 
numbers of transfers which currently occur can be explained by the following 
factors (see Bjornlund 2001; DNRE 2001):  
•  administrative issues — including restrictions on inter-regional trade and time 
delays for processing entitlement transfers 
•  taxation issues — purchases of entitlements may be treated as a capital asset and 
the cost only deducted when the asset is sold 
•  the need to maintain an annual income — access to irrigation water ameliorates 
farmers’ exposure to rainfall variability 
•  the perception that selling water erodes the capital value of the farm and reduces 
future options (discussed further in chapter 6) 
•  policy uncertainty.     
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•  Irrigated crops have greater total water needs than can be satisfied by local 
rainfall. Without irrigation, they could not be grown in that area. The physical 
needs for irrigation water is the difference between the total water needs of 
irrigators’ crops and effective rainfall over a season. 
•  The total water needs of all crops increase in hotter years because of increased 
plant growth, transpiration and evaporation. As rainfall is generally lower in 
these years, the demand for irrigation water can increase substantially. The 
corollary is that the demand for irrigation water is relatively less in cooler and 
wetter years. Consequently, an irrigator’s demand for irrigation water changes 
from year to year. 
•  The existence of markets for irrigation water means that irrigators can sell as 
well as use irrigation water, sometimes simultaneously. The nature of an 
irrigator’s activities influences decisions to sell or use water. For example, an 
irrigator growing annual crops is likely to buy traded allocations when water 
prices are relatively low, and sell when they are relatively high. 
•  Markets for seasonal allocations change from irrigation area to irrigation area, 
and from year to year. In any year the market for seasonal allocations will 
depend on the allocation decisions of the relevant water utility, as well as 
seasonal conditions in both the headwaters of the catchment and locally.  
     




3  A conceptual framework 
In this chapter, economic theory is examined to explain why water demand is 
inelastic at low prices and becomes more elastic at higher prices. Empirical 
estimates of the responsiveness of demand for irrigation water are then reviewed. It 
appears that there are no published econometric studies that estimate the price 
responsiveness of demand of Australian irrigators. Consequently, the focus of this 
chapter is on mathematical programming studies that model the responsiveness of 
representative farms with assumptions about production relationships. 
3.1  Factors affecting demand responsiveness 
Marshall (1920) argued that four factors can lead to inelastic (derived) demand for 
production inputs: 
•  other inputs that are complements in production are inelastically supplied 
•  the output, that it facilitates production of, is itself inelastically demanded 
•  the input accounts for only a small part of production costs 
•  the input has no good substitutes. 
Input complements 
Because water is an essential input in irrigation enterprises, it is unlikely that prices 
of input complements will significantly influence irrigator responsiveness to the 
price of irrigation water. 
Demand for outputs 
The demand for outputs does not much explain why the demand for irrigation water 
tends to be inelastic. The value of water is related to its value in producing an output 
— its contribution to a valuable end-product. The value of water as an input is 
therefore dependent on the price of the commodity produced. 
     




Export markets are important for most irrigated production. In these markets, 
irrigators are price takers and have little influence over market prices. Therefore, at 
the relevant range of outputs and inputs, demand for much irrigated production 
tends to be price elastic. Other things being equal, elastic demand for an irrigator’s 
outputs is more likely to lead to elastic derived demand for their inputs. 
Irrigation water and farm costs 
If the demand for an irrigator’s produce was relatively elastic, hence cost increases 
cannot be passed through to commodity prices, the degree to which irrigation costs 
contribute to total farm costs may affect farmers’ responses to rising water prices.  
If irrigation costs make up a large proportion of total activity variable costs, rises in 
the price of irrigation water can have a significant impact on profit margins. This 
could lead to more elastic demand for irrigation water because rising water prices 
could make some irrigated activities relatively unprofitable. Irrigators would 
respond by reducing (or ceasing) production of relatively unprofitable activities. In 
contrast, if irrigation costs are only a small component of total activity costs, rising 
irrigation water prices may not affect the relative profitability of activities and 
irrigators may largely continue their current activities. 
The costs of existing farm irrigation infrastructure are sunk costs, are not affected 
by changes in the prices of water, and are not included in the following estimates of 
water costs as a proportion of total activity costs. The estimated share of irrigation 
costs as a percentage of total costs is highest in rice (16 per cent) and dairy (14 per 
cent), and lowest in grapes (3 per cent), vegetables (2 per cent) and fruit (1 per cent) 
(CSIRO 2002). In part, this reflects the relative capital intensity of perennial 
horticultural activities, and labour intensity of vegetables. Other things being equal, 
these relative costs shares may imply that the demand for irrigation water would be 
relatively more elastic in the rice and dairy industries, and relatively less elastic in 
horticultural industries.  
Substitution possibilities  
Other things being equal, demand for an input will be inelastic if the input has few 
substitutes. All plants require water — but irrigators have choices as to outputs 
produced and the mixture of inputs used in production (including the sources of 
irrigation water and the technologies used to apply it). The more substitution 
choices available to an irrigator, the more elastic their demand for irrigation water 
may be.     




The main substitution choices available to irrigators will be discussed in the next 
three chapters. These responses will be divided into those typically undertaken in 
the short run (chapter 4) and those undertaken in the long run. Chapter 5 focuses on 
long run substitution choices involving the sourcing of irrigation water, and 
investment in differing irrigation technologies. Chapter 6 discusses broader long run 
adjustment options. 
Individual versus market responsiveness 
Although the focus of this study is on the responses of individual irrigators to 
changing water prices, the economic consequences of aggregate behaviour should 
not be overlooked. This is particularly the case for irrigation water because 
irrigators can be both buyers and sellers of water. The demand and supply of water 
into the market are derived from irrigators’ individual water demands. 
In general, the broader market response will follow the movements of the individual 
demands from which it is aggregated. The Productivity Commission (2004) note an 
interesting case — that of changing utility prices, possibly through the levying of 
environmental taxes on water use. In cases where the utility price remains below 
market prices for traded water, price rises through the imposition of water taxes 
may not lead to any changes in the aggregate quantity of water being demanded — 
taxes simply reduce the price of traded water by the level of the tax. 
3.2  Estimation studies and market data 
Data of observed prices and quantities of water exchanged are required to estimate 
the responsiveness of demand. Data of this kind have been difficult to obtain 
because of the relative infancy of Australian water markets. Analyses of the 
responsiveness of demand for irrigation water using Australian market data have not 
been published to date.  
A large and open market for trading water is the electronic exchange ‘Watermove’ 
operated by Goulburn Murray Water. In this market, observed prices paid for 
seasonal allocations during 2002-03 were much higher than previously experienced 
(see table 2.4). The high prices paid in that year compared to previous years shows 
that some irrigators’ demand for water can be highly inelastic under some 
conditions.  
Brennan (2004) plotted bids of buyers on the Watermove exchange and concluded 
that the price elasticity of demand for traded seasonal allocations during the 
2002-03 irrigation season changed substantially during the irrigation season. 
Demand for traded seasonal allocations was relatively more elastic at the start of the 
irrigation season in August when there was some expectation of an increase in     




allocations for the season. Demand for traded seasonal allocations became more 
price inelastic between October and March as these expectations were disappointed. 
Finally, demand for traded seasonal allocations became more price elastic at the end 
of the irrigation season, following rain in April, and the fact that many potential 
buyers had either purchased their desired volume of water, or adjusted their 
production plans to suit available water.  
Some of the factors that could lead to relatively high prices and changing elasticities 
of demand for traded seasonal allocations are discussed in box 3.1.  
 
Box 3.1  Understanding some recent market responses:  
the Greater Goulburn trading subdistrict 
The 2002-03 irrigation season was the first year that GMW did not deliver full seasonal 
allocations, with only 57 per cent of water entitlement allocated in the Greater Goulburn 
trading subdistrict (or approximately half the average seasonal allocation of the 
previous 10 years). Prices of up to $500 per megalitre were paid for traded allocations 
during the year. 
The relatively high market prices increased the opportunity cost of water for all 
irrigators. Trade occurs when some irrigators choose to forgo the use of their seasonal 
allocation, and sell it to other irrigators. Sellers do this because they consider the 
expected returns from trading water are greater than the likely returns for irrigated 
activities.  
Some horticulturists with perennial crops may have faced the risk of ‘catastrophic loss’ 
— that their crops would die from insufficient water. This group is likely to have a 
relatively inelastic demand for water, and to have purchased seasonal allocations 
rather than lose their perennial crops. In the absence of water trading, the economic 
costs of the reduction in supply of irrigation water in the 2002-03 irrigation season 
would have been much greater because irrigators with perennial crops would not have 
been able to supplement their seasonal allocations, and may have lost part of their 
crops. 
The potential influence of strategic bidding to purchase (or sell) seasonal allocations 
may also be important. Early in the season, some irrigators may have identified a 
potential shortfall in the availability of irrigation water. They may have believed that 
there was some probability that either local rainfall, or rainfall in the catchment area 
and a resulting increase in seasonal allocations, could reduce the potential shortfall. 
They may have also believed that prices of traded water could decrease if there was 
an increase in allocations. These beliefs could influence them to spread purchases 
over the irrigation season, rather than acquire the potential shortfall in one purchase. 
Weekly trading on Watermove would allow an irrigator to enter a relatively low bid early 
in the season, and revise their bidding strategy each week until they had acquired the 
seasonal allocations they needed. This, in turn, could affect their farm management 
decisions. For example, failure to acquire a certain volume of water below a threshold 
price could mean that they curtailed some planned activities, reducing their expected 
water needs. 
     





Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are built on a number of technical 
and behavioural assumptions (including input substitution choices) about the 
economic agents which they describe. In most of these models, the elasticity of 
water demand is implicit in the choices the modellers make regarding some of the 
parameter values. TERM-Water is a CGE model used to examine the effects of 
water trade — within it water demand is highly inelastic in both the short run and 
long run (see appendix A), even at relatively high market prices. 
Mathematical programming 
Econometric estimation of demand for water using market price data is difficult 
when the markets for water are thin or non-existent (de Fraiture and Perry 2002). 
Consequently, analysts have relied on the indirect approach of using models of 
agricultural production to derive the demand for irrigation water.  
Mathematical programming models can be used to derive elasticities by estimating 
the value of the marginal product of water in an agricultural production system. 
Given other farm inputs, the models can be used to determine the additional value 
of agricultural production for each additional unit of water used. Generally, these 
models are:  
•  designed for representative enterprises at either the region or farm level 
•  based on a stylised ‘average’ farm using average or industry standard 
technologies and operating in ‘average’ seasonal conditions 
•  solved for the optimising choices made by a decision maker who controls 
endogenous variables of the model 
•  of step-wise functional form such that at threshold prices irrigators are assumed 
to alter their production systems enabling reductions in water use 
•  of a short run nature. Short run production options are the only variables used. 
An exception is Pagan et al. (1997) which used long run variables that permitted 
investment, such as new irrigation technology, and estimates of the long run 
price elasticity of demand. 
In such analyses, the location considered will determine the dominant agricultural 
industries. If the analysis occurs at a regional level, a number of different 
production systems may be involved. Some regions may be dominated by a single 
crop or species of livestock. For example, irrigated cotton is the typical crop in the 
Namoi River region, a rotation of irrigated crops including rice is the typical crop in 
the MIA and dairy is the predominant industry in the GV district.     




The irrigation water demand relationships estimated by eight different studies 
within the MDB are compared in appendix A. In all the models, demand is inelastic 
at relatively low prices ($0–$20 per megalitre). Some models indicated that demand 
was inelastic for prices in the range $0–$55 per megalitre (Read, Sturgess and 
Associates 1991). In most studies, demand was estimated to be inelastic within the 
range of utility supply charges applying at the time of the study. 
In general, the estimated elasticity of demand increased at higher price levels. In 
studies that reported more than one elasticity (over different price ranges), it was 
found that water demand functions were more elastic at higher price ranges — with 
elasticity greater than 1 at the highest price range considered. It is difficult to apply 
these results to the behaviour of irrigators participating in recent water markets 
because the observed price of water (especially in markets for seasonal allocations) 
has exceeded, at times considerably, the highest of the price ranges considered in 
the models. All linear programming models predicted that demand by irrigators 
would become increasingly elastic at prices where strong trade has been observed 
(see, for example, Briggs-Clark et al. 1986). The highest price considered in the 
linear programming models examined in appendix A was $100 per megalitre. Trade 
has been observed at prices in excess of $100 per megalitre since 2001-02. 
Allowing a longer time horizon within the mathematical models increased the 
estimate of the responsiveness of water demand. This is because more response 
options to rising water prices become available. For example, Pagan et al. (1997) 
(allowing for investment in new irrigation capital) calculated that the own price 
elasticity of demand for prices between $30 and $50 per megalitre was –0.19 in the 
short run and –0.25 in the long run. Whereas, for prices between $50 and $70 per 
megalitre, the elasticities of demand were –2.8 in the short run and –3.0 in the long 
run. 
The price elasticity of demand was generally found to become more elastic beyond 
some threshold price (see appendix A, table A.1). The OECD (1999) observed that 
in such models the level of the price threshold depended on: 
•  the economic productivity of the water 
•  the set of alternative production strategies that farmers adopt in order to 
substitute for water consumption 
•  the proportion of land devoted to permanently-irrigated crops 
•  the irrigation technologies in place 
•  the size of the seasonal allocation.     




Limitations of the models 
Any model is a partial representation of reality. For example, farm level models are 
based on stylised ‘production functions’ for agricultural processes. Many of the 
models that have been used to estimate the price elasticity of demand for irrigation 
water have been constructed by aggregating farms into a stylised farm for a region. 
This may involve different types of agricultural production being incorporated into 
the one irrigation district. This limits the conclusions that can be drawn about the 
responsiveness of water demand to characteristics of certain cropping or livestock 
processes, and whole systems. 
Another limitation is the limited range of prices over which responsiveness of 
demand was considered. Most estimates derive elasticities from price ranges well 
below the observed prices for recent irrigation seasons. Given that the 
responsiveness of water demand varies between different price and water 
combinations, the estimates hold little significance beyond the ranges for which 
they were estimated.  
Existing models were based on a yearly time frame and with average rainfall. These 
models can mask fluctuations in water demand throughout stages of crop 
development or other agricultural processes. They also mask the effect that 
uncertainty of rainfall and seasonal allocations (including timing of allocation 
announcements) can have on farmer decision making. 
3.3 Summary   
•  There are no published empirical estimates of the price responsiveness of 
demand for irrigation water in Australia derived from observing irrigators’ 
behaviour in historical water purchases. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of 
data about water trading that could enable estimations to be made in the future. 
•  Mathematical models of representative farm production systems have been used 
to estimate elasticities of demand for water in major irrigation areas. All the 
models estimate very inelastic demand for irrigation water at low prices ($0–$50 
per megalitre) and less inelastic demand at higher prices.  
•  The low price ranges in which inelastic demand is predicted generally fall within 
existing utility supply charges. However, price ranges over which elastic demand 
is predicted are well below those recently observed in markets for seasonal 
allocations.      




4  Short run responses 
This chapter discusses the factors influencing irrigators’ short run responses to 
changing charges by water utilities and market prices of seasonal allocations. The 
short run is defined as a period of such length that the mix of activities on the farm 
cannot be changed, and only some inputs can be changed. Section 4.1 discusses 
factors affecting short run responses to changing water charges and prices. Possible 
short run responses in the rice, dairy and perennial horticultural industries are 
described in section 4.2. 
4.1  Influences on irrigator responses 
An irrigator’s short run response to increases in the cost of water (box 4.1) depends 
on, among other things: 
•  whether the increase relates to the fixed or variable component of utility charges  
•  whether trade is allowed 
•  what costs are still to be incurred. 
Fixed and variable costs and charges 
In the short run, changes in fixed costs (such as the volume independent component 
of a water utility charge) may not influence production decisions because the total 
cost remains the same irrespective of the quantity of water used. This is not to say 
that fixed costs are unimportant: they affect an irrigator’s profitability and influence 
long run decisions.  
In contrast, changes in variable costs (such as the volume dependent component of a 
water utility charge) may affect production decisions even in the short run. An 
irrigator facing an increase in a variable cost may be able to reduce the resultant 
impact of the cost increase on profits by reducing the amount of the input used 
and/or substituting other inputs.      




The impact of trade in seasonal allocations 
Allowing trade in seasonal allocations adds an additional opportunity for holders of 
entitlements to water. In the absence of trade, the opportunity cost of irrigation 
water is established by the most profitable available activity on the farm. An 
irrigator will continue to use irrigation water (to the limit of their entitlement) while 
the marginal revenue from applying an additional megalitre exceeds the marginal 
cost. If variable utility charges are relatively low, the marginal cost will also be 
relatively low for gravity irrigation systems. In most irrigation districts in 2003-04, 
typical variable charges ranged from $5.62 to $12.40 per megalitre delivered (see 
table 2.1).  
When trade is allowed, the opportunity cost of irrigation water could be either the 
market price of seasonal allocations in the zone(s) in which trade is permitted, or 
expected net returns from the most profitable available farm activity. An irrigator’s 
most profitable use for water is to sell it to another irrigator if, at the margin, the 
expected net revenue of sale exceeds the expected increase in net revenue from 
using the water to irrigate their crops. 
Costs still to be incurred  
Planting costs could have been important in determining which crop to plant, but 
once a crop is planted, the costs of planting are ‘sunk’ and do not effect irrigators’ 
future decision making. Consequently, to maximise the net revenue from the crop, 
an irrigator’s economic decisions are restricted (in the normal range of events) to 
controlling future inputs to that crop.  
Irrigators will continue production of a crop while expected marginal revenue 
exceeds the expected marginal costs still to be incurred. As the growing season 
progresses and additional expenditures are incurred, more and more costs become 
sunk. Irrigators become less sensitive to increases in water prices as harvest 
approaches and more costs become sunk. The final decision to be made is whether 
to harvest, and this will be done while expected revenue exceeds expected harvest 
and post-harvest costs (box 4.1, also see Douglas, Dwyer and Peterson 2004).  
In contrast to annual crops, many perennial horticultural crops are characterised by 
a large capital investment, a relatively long pre-productive period where the crop is 
maintained (sometimes four to five years), and then a (usually lengthy) period of 
production (box 4.2). Having invested in a perennial horticultural crop, an irrigator 
may be relatively unresponsive to changing water prices for the life of the crop. 
This is because establishment costs are sunk, variable costs are usually small 
compared to variable revenues, and there would be large costs to replant the crop.      





Box 4.1  Average and marginal prices paid for water 
The gross margin budget for long grain rice in the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area shows 
expected gross revenue of around $2850 per hectare, variable costs of around $1100 
per hectare and a gross margin of around $1750 per hectare. The budget shows an 
expected gross margin of around $135 per megalitre of water used. This means that if 
the average price of water increased by $135 per megalitre or more before planting, an 
irrigator should not plant — they would expect to lose money.  
However, if an irrigator needed to purchase a marginal volume of water immediately 
before harvest (say just 0.5 megalitre of water per hectare), the price that the irrigator 
could pay may be relatively high if it ‘saved the crop’ and ensured harvest. For 
example, paying a $500 per megalitre (or $250 per hectare) for the final watering 
would be worthwhile if it ensured an otherwise doubtful harvest and about $2500 of net 
revenue (after allowing for harvest and post-harvest costs of $350 per hectare). 
Sources: NSW Agriculture (2003); Douglas, Dwyer and Peterson (2004). 
   
 
Box 4.2  A selected perennial horticultural crop 
The annual and cumulative cash flows resulting from investment in a selected 
horticultural crop are shown below. The crop is planted on six hectares, and has an 
expected productive period of more than 40 years. The installation of a drip fertigation 
system (an irrigation system — typically drip irrigation — which can also deliver 
fertilisers) is the major part of the initial capital costs (about $10  000 per hectare). 
Skilfully used, a fertigation system can ensure that most fertilisers used are taken up by 
the crop minimising fertiliser accessions to ground or surface water. Fertigation 
systems are more expensive to install than conventional irrigation systems. Fertilisers 
used in fertigation systems may cost more than conventional fertilisers because they 
must be readily soluble in water. 
When the crop reaches maturity, the expected net annual cash flow is around $8000 
per hectare. The expected net cash flow would have to decline considerably, and/or an 
even more profitable crop become available, before this activity would be discontinued.  
















Net annual cash flow
Cumulative cash flow
 
 Source: PC estimates. 
     




4.2  Short run responses in selected industries 
In this section, possible industry-specific, short run management responses to 
changing water prices are discussed. 
Rice  
Some of the key characteristics of rice growing are summarised in box 4.3. Rice 
growers’ responses to an increase in the unit cost of water will depend upon 
whether the increase occurs before or after planting. Before planting, their response 
will be whether to plant, and if so, how much and when. After planting, their 
response will reflect the costs expected to be incurred until the crop is harvested, 
and the expected returns from the crop.  
 
Box 4.3  Rice growing in the southern Murray–Darling Basin 
Rice farms tend to be mixed farms where one of the activities is rice growing. Rice 
growing predominantly occurs in the Murrumbidgee and Murray valleys.  
Most rice growers have general access water entitlements which generally have a 
relatively low supply reliability. Rice growers in the Murrumbidgee Valley are likely to 
hold a larger water entitlement per unit of land than those in the Murray Valley, while 
Murray Valley irrigators are more likely to trade water partly because of their lower 
entitlements.  
Environmental standards constrain annual rice plantings on individual farms to 30 per 
cent of the soils that can be suitably planted to rice. Under the standards, rice can only 
be grown on clay soils that minimise accessions to the watertable. A common rotation 
on a rice farm would commence with rice being planted as a summer crop. This could 
immediately be followed by a winter crop (often cereals such as wheat) to take 
advantage of the residual soil moisture from the rice crop. The residual soil moisture 
from the rice crop ensures the water needs of the wheat crop for several months after 
planting, and is an important component of the overall rotation, providing both 
economic, agronomic and environmental benefits. Singh et al. (2004) state that the 
environmental benefits include ‘more efficient use, minimising run-offs and accessions 
to the groundwater and increasing water use from upflow from shallow water tables’. 
They estimate that planting a winter crop immediately after rice reduces recharge by 
about one megalitre per hectare.  
The initial wheat crop could be followed by another wheat crop, which in turn could be 
followed by an oat crop under-sown with lucerne or pasture. Depending on the 
individual rotation, it could be at least four years before rice was replanted in the same 
paddock. 
Sources: Ricegrowers Association of Australia, pers. Comm.., 3 February 2004; Singh et al. (2004). 
 
     




In years of below average allocation (and relatively higher traded prices, other 
things being equal), rice growers may choose to reduce the area of rice planted, and 
use a relatively higher proportion of available water on their growing wheat crops, 
to maintain existing pastures, or to sell some water. Rice growers closely monitor 
the likely seasonal allocations before planting. They may choose to change varieties 
and plant rice later in the season in order to gain a greater insight into the likely 
seasonal allocation for the year. If their allocation is not sufficient to water the 
planted area of rice, they face exposure to the market in seasonal allocations and the 
risk of having to pay a high price for the required water. In years with extremely 
low allocations, where sufficient water may not be available at a price to allow rice 
to be grown profitably, they may choose not to plant rice at all. 
Once a rice crop has been planted, the rice grower will attempt to obtain sufficient 
water to ensure that the crop is harvested and the demand for irrigation water tends 
to become relatively inelastic. Therefore, risk-averse rice growers plant if they 
believe that they are likely to receive most of the required water from their 
allocation. Consequently, it is likely that they may only require a relatively small 
additional allocation from the water utility, and/or purchase of traded allocations, to 
meet their water needs. Some rice growers (with less risk aversion) may plant with 
lower allocations and rely on increases in announced allocations and the market for 
seasonal allocations to ensure their crop. 
Typical to wetter years 
The gross margin budget for long grain rice in the MIA is about $135 per megalitre 
(the water needs of a rice crop are described in box 4.4) (NSW Agriculture 2003). 
This implies that the average cost per megalitre of irrigation water would have to 
approach $160 per megalitre (an increase of $135 over the budgeted price of $25 
per megalitre) before the variable costs of growing the rice crop exceeded its return 
and the planting of rice became unprofitable. However, a combination of dryland 
agricultural activities and the sale of seasonal allocations is likely to become a more 
profitable alternative well before average water prices reach $160 per megalitre. 
Very dry years 
In southern Australia, very dry years tend to be relatively hotter years. Hotter 
seasons increase the water needs of rice because of the related increase in the rate of 
plant growth, a lack of soil moisture prior to sowing, and because there will be more 
evaporation from the rice paddies.      





Box 4.4  Estimated water needs of a rice crop 
NSW Agriculture’s gross margin budgets for rice are based on 13  megalitres of 
irrigation water (industry figures indicate an average of 12 megalitres) being required to 
produce a hectare of rice in an average season. Annual average rainfall in the rice 
growing areas of the Murrumbidgee and Murray valleys is about 400 millimetres. About 
half the rainfall, or the equivalent to the application of 2 megalitres of irrigation water 
per hectare, typically occurs immediately prior to planting, or during, the rice growing 
season. Therefore, the total water needs of a rice crop is, on average, about 15 
megalitres during the growing season. 
A typical rice farm in the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area is 240 hectares. In an average 
year, about one-third of the farm is sown to rice, with the balance being used either for 
the production of cereals, other summer crops or pasture — all of which may be 
irrigated in drier seasons.  
A typical rice farm has a water entitlement of 1300 megalitres. For example, 
80 hectares of rice would typically need about 1040 megalitres of irrigation water. The 
balance of the water entitlement (about 260 megalitres) would be available to meet the 
irrigation needs of the other activities on the farm, to ‘carry-over’ to the next season, or 
for sale. It should be noted that in this scenario, all available water is either delivered 
by the water utility, or stored until the following year. 
Sources: PC estimates; Ricegrowers Association of Australia, pers. comm., 3 February and 28 July 2004; 
NSW Agriculture (2003).     
Water utilities are likely to reduce the seasonal allocation of irrigation water in very 
dry years. For example, in the 2002-03 irrigation season, rice growers in the MIA 
received a final allocation of 38 per cent of their water entitlement. For a typical 
rice farm, only about 500 megalitres would be delivered in these years.  
Other crops (wheat and pasture) on the rice farm will also have an increased need 
for irrigation water. To the extent that these crops have been planted and are 
growing, the irrigator may give watering these crops a high priority. The irrigator 
may be aware that the prices for grain and fodder are likely to be relatively high in a 
very dry year, increasing the relative profitability of these crops. 
Continuing the example in box 4.4, assume the water needs of wheat and pasture 
crops increased by 10 per cent from about 260 megalitres in an average year to 
about 290 megalitres in a very dry year. This would mean that only about 
210 megalitres of irrigation water (about one quarter of the normal quantity) would 
be available to grow rice in a year with similar allocations to 2002-03. The dry 
conditions will also lead to a reduced supply, and therefore relatively high price, of 
traded allocations. Consequently, the rice grower may only plant an area of rice 
proportionate to their reduced seasonal allocation. For example, only about 38 000 
hectares were planted with rice in 2002-03 compared to 150  000 hectares in       




2001-02, and around 65  000 hectares was planted to rice during 2003-04   
(ABARE 2003, 2004). 
An important feature of this analysis is that the demand for irrigation water is for 
the whole rice farm, and not just the water demand of the rice crop itself. The large 
variation in the observed plantings of rice during very dry years is explained in part 
by the use of a higher proportion of the reduced supply of irrigation water for other 
activities on the rice farm to which the owners were already committed.  
Dairy farmers  
Dairy farming accounts for the majority of irrigation water used for pasture in the 
southern MDB. In the GMW district, dairy farming represents over 50 per cent of 
all irrigation water use. The other major dairying area is near Finley in the MI 
district. In these districts, the main form of feed of dairy cows is grazing — either 
on perennial rye grass and clover pastures, or to a lesser extent annual pastures. 
Seasonal calving is common in dairy herds. Typically, the majority of the herd are 
mated to calve in spring. Most milk is produced during spring, summer, and autumn 
when pasture growth is highest. Cows are then ‘dried off’ in the winter, prior to 
calving. 
Wet years 
Wet years can often limit production. In wet years, perennial pasture growth can be 
slowed if temperatures are low and/or soils are waterlogged for part of the season. 
Pasture growth can be sufficient without irrigation water, but usually for only part 
of the season. If a wet spring is encountered, dairy farmers tend to hold rather than 
sell water with the expectation that they will irrigate more frequently at the peak of 
summer, and as an insurance against not getting good rains in autumn to provide 
pasture before winter — an ‘autumn break’. 
Wetter conditions can make the production of good quality hay and silage difficult. 
They can also result in greater availability of poorer quality concentrated feeds at 
relatively low prices, such as rain-damaged wheat and barley. 
Typical years 
Over the spring and summer months, dairy farmers grow and store pasture (usually 
in the form of hay or silage) for the following winter when pasture growth is low. 
Some farmers grow forage crops which can be harvested over the winter for the dry 
and calving herd.     




Dairy farmers plan feed and water requirements many months in advance. Most 
dairy farms are heavily stocked compared to other grazing enterprises (stocking 
rates of three cows per hectare are not uncommon) and pastures are carefully 
managed to ensure sufficient feed is available for the herd on a daily basis. 
Relatively small declines in feed quality and quantity can have a significant impact 
on milk production. Over the irrigation season, pastures can deteriorate rapidly if 
sufficient water is not applied at appropriate intervals. Dairy farmers apply more 
fertilisers (relative to other livestock farmers) to boost the quantity of pasture that 
can be grown from a megalitre of irrigation water.  
Providing more feed at the start of lactation makes it possible to extend and increase 
the rest of the lactation. Pasture is the primary form of feed input but it can at times 
be cost effective to substitute it at the margin. It is common practice for dairy 
farmers to supplement pastures by also feeding concentrates and other high energy 
foodstuffs over the milk producing period. A typical concentrate would be crushed 
grain which is fed as the cow is milked. Assuming similar labour costs and 
sufficient physical infrastructure, the choice depends on the prices of milk, 
irrigation water, and the feed input. Dairy farmers may find irrigating pastures less 
economic than supplementary feeding when water prices are relatively high and 
grain and fodder prices are relatively low. 
Given standard stocking rates, it is relatively unusual for dairy farmers to sell cows 
on the basis of feed availability — cows are culled for poorer production rather than 
marginal feed constraints. Dairy cows are costly to purchase (in excess of $1000 for 
a two year old ) — taking two years to breed and enter the herd for their first 
lactation. Cows also take a number of years to reach peak production and can have 
productive lives in excess of 8 to 10 years. Selling stock can also result in lost 
genetic potential from the herd. When pasture feed shortages occur, dairy farmers 
will purchase feed, and/or agist part of their herd, rather than reduce their standard 
stock rate significantly. The extent of this is evident by the recent drought in the 
GMW district where dairy farmers agisted cows with other dairy farmers in 
Gippsland and Western District rather than cull parts of their herd. 
Very dry years 
In very dry years, dairy farmers are likely to irrigate their pasture about every 
fourteen days at the peak of summer. In these years, storages are likely to be lower 
and ‘sales’ water may not be available. Dairy farmers are unlikely to grow the usual 
volumes of pasture for hay and silage and consequently will purchase fodder from 
other farmers. Reduced (or no) ‘sales’ water and lower allocations mean that dairy 
farmers have to chose between decline of production, purchasing additional water,     




or purchasing additional fodder and concentrates. There is a limit to how much 
concentrate can be fed to a cow, as cows need roughage for their rumens. 
Most dairy farmers will use more labour to ensure water use is economised. The 
farmer will spend more time monitoring the timings and avoid wastage, such as 
water overrunning irrigation bays and becoming return flows. Dairy farmers may 
also chose to irrigate smaller areas of the farm, for example, avoiding irrigating 
lighter and more porous soils, or irrigating half bays so seepage is minimised. 
These changes are also likely to coincide with increasing use of supplementary feed. 
Grains are usually the first choice, but if large volumes are required pasture based 
feeds such as hay and silage are likely to be also used. The choice and timing of 
these feeds will depend on the relative prices of the feeds and traded allocations. 
Usually in drier seasons, the price of supplementary feed is dearer because grain 
and hay producers have also had a poorer season. 
Ceasing milk production for the season is usually not economic until later in the 
lactation when cows can be dried off early with minimal losses. Production lost 
early in the season cannot be easily recovered. Dairy farmers may choose to dry off 
relatively less productive cows rather than effect the production capacity of their 
more productive cows.  
Perennial horticulture 
Perennial horticulture in the southern MDB includes industries such as wine grapes, 
olives, citrus, stone and pome fruits. Each industry has its own special 
characteristics, but the factors influencing their demand for irrigation water will be 
relatively similar. This section describes the likely need for irrigation water by a 
hypothetical perennial horticulture farm in average to wetter years, and in very dry 
years. It is assumed that this farm is located in the upper Goulburn Valley, Victoria. 
(box 4.5). 
Typical to wetter years 
In typical to wetter years, the irrigator described in box 4.5 would attempt to trade 
the small volume of ‘excess’ water provided the expected proceeds exceeded 
transaction costs.      





Box 4.5  Estimated water needs of a selected perennial horticultural 
crop 
In typical years, a perennial horticultural crop will require about 6  megalitres of 
irrigation water per hectare (assuming use of drip irrigation). In addition, it will receive 
about 700 millimetres of rainfall, or the equivalent of 7 megalitres of irrigated water per 
hectare.  
The hypothetical horticultural farm is about 20 hectares, which means that in an 
average year about 120 megalitres of irrigation water and 140 megalitres of rain, a total 
of 260 megalitres, will be required to meet the water needs of the crop. The gross 
margin of the crop is about $6000 per hectare. 
The irrigator has a water entitlement of 130 megalitres, which allows for some increase 
in water needs in drier and hotter years.  
The produce is exported, and therefore prices received are unlikely to increase due to 
local scarcity. 
Source: PC estimates.   
 
Very dry years 
In very dry years, the water needs of the crop increase. Assuming the irrigator uses 
drip irrigation, the increase in irrigation water lost to evaporation should be 
relatively small. If the irrigator is using a drip irrigation system efficiently, there 
may be little potential for water savings by altering the irrigation schedule to 
provide more frequent waterings with lower volumes. 
If the seasonal allocation from the water utility is reduced in a very dry year — as 
happened in 2002-03 — the irrigator is likely to be willing to pay very high prices 
for traded allocations. This is because the costs of allowing the crop to die and the 
subsequent replanting, including the loss of income during the pre-productive 
period, would far exceed the cost of purchasing traded allocations. Continuing the 
example in box 4.5, assume in 2002-03, the total water needs of the irrigator’s crop 
increased from 260 to 270 megalitres because of the hot and dry conditions. 
Meanwhile, the irrigator would have received 57 per cent of his water entitlement, 
or about 75  megalitres as an allocation. Annual rainfall in 2002-03 was about 
400 millimetres (about 4 megalitres per hectare or 80 megalitres on the farm). Total 
water available from rain and seasonal allocations would have been about 
155 megalitres. The irrigator would have needed to purchase about 115 megalitres 
of traded allocations to meet the water needs of the crop. Even if he paid the highest 
observed price of $500 per megalitre during the 2002-03 irrigation season (a total 
cost of about $57 500), the crop would still have produced a positive gross margin     




of about $60 000 in that year (but the main benefit is the avoidance of catastrophic 
loss of the perennial crop). 
4.3 Summary 
•  Water utilities’ charges typically have fixed components (based on water 
entitlement) and variable components (based on water usage). In the short run, 
irrigators can be expected to respond to changes in variable costs and charges 
whose impact depends on the volume of water used. They are less likely to 
respond to increases in fixed costs and charges whose impact is independent of 
the volume of water used. 
•  Once a crop is planted, it is likely that irrigators become less responsive to 
changing water prices as the production season progresses and harvest 
approaches. 
•  A crop’s need for irrigation water tends to increase in hotter and dryer years 
because of a related increase in the rate of plant growth, and increased 
transpiration. The reduced rainfall in these years means that there will be an 
increased need for irrigation water to replace the rainfall deficit. As well, there is 
greater evaporation of irrigation water in channels and when applied to fields.  
•  Rice growers tend to reduce the area planted to rice in years when they expect 
relatively low seasonal allocations. Once a rice grower has incurred the costs of 
planting a crop, short run demand for irrigation water tends to become more 
inelastic. 
•  Dairy farmers tend to have more substitution choices than rice growers or 
horticulturists. Possible substitution choices include substituting purchased 
fodder for irrigation water, or grazing ‘dry’ cows on non-irrigated pastures. The 
relative prices of water compared to the relative prices of substitution choices 
will determine which choice is more profitable. 
•  Horticulturists with perennial crops may have an inelastic short run demand for 
irrigation water because variable costs are usually small, compared to variable 
revenues, and the costs of replanting if part of their crop dies. This group is 
likely to purchase traded allocations if their water utility’s allocation falls 
significantly.  
     




5  Long run responses — sources and 
use of water 
In the long run, all outputs and inputs are variable. Two broad technological 
responses are discussed in section 5.1 — seeking irrigation water from sources other 
than water utilities; and investing in water-saving irrigation technologies. This is 
followed by a discussion of two recent Australian case studies examining the impact 
of adopting new irrigation technologies. Long run responses in selected industries 
are discussed in section 5.2. 
5.1 Broad  technological  responses 
Substitution choices available to irrigators in the long run include seeking 
alternative sources of irrigation water and/or adopting more efficient irrigation 
technologies. 
Alternative sources of irrigation water 
Some irrigators may be able to substitute the purchase of water from utilities, and/or 
markets, with water from other sources, including: 
•  storing surface water runoff from rainfall and irrigation in farm dams 
•  opportunistic pumping of passing return flows and passing flows in surface 
drains and watercourses 
•  pumping of groundwater. 
The availability and cost of water from these sources will determine the extent to 
which they are substitutes for water supplied by utilities. Farms will have differing 
endowments of these resources and access to them is regulated through licensing 
and property entitlement arrangements. Alternative (non-utility) sources of 
irrigation water tend to be opportunistic and supplementary at the margin rather 
than perfect substitutes for utility supply. Nevertheless, some irrigators may have 
large endowments of, and licences to use, alternative water supplies. The extent to 
which they can act as substitutes will depend on the extraction costs. For example, 
some irrigation districts overlay deep aquifers and some irrigators (usually only a     




small number) may have licences to extract water from the aquifer. In addition, in 
irrigation schemes where flood technologies are employed, irrigators often have 
access to return flows from their own and neighbouring farms, and localised 
groundwater aquifers are often recharged by regular flood irrigation. In some 
regions the underlying salinity of groundwater can limit its usefulness. For some 
irrigators, access to alternative water sources may mean that their demand for water 
from utilities becomes more elastic as charges rise. 
In general, alternative sources of irrigation water are imperfect substitutes for water 
supplied by utilities because alternative supplies tend to be constrained both in 
terms of volumes and certainty of supply. Regulations governing the harvesting of 
surface and groundwater mean that the total volume of water available for use by 
irrigators is unlikely to increase substantially over existing harvesting entitlements. 
Recent changes in New South Wales and Victoria (box 5.1) effectively prevent 
irrigators from obtaining further access to additional irrigation water by restricting 
the construction of more farm irrigation dams. 
 
Box 5.1  Farm dam regulation in New South Wales and Victoria 
The New South Wales Farm Dams Policy limits to 10 per cent of farm area the amount 
of runoff which can be harvested for all purposes, including irrigation. For most of New 
South Wales (the exception is the Western Division), this has been expressed in terms 
of a ‘harvestable right per hectare’ which ranges from 0.02 megalitres per hectare in 
low rainfall areas to 0.16 megalitres per hectare in high rainfall areas. The volume of 
water than can be harvested is then calculated by multiplying the area of a farm by the 
appropriate harvestable right per hectare. The New South Wales Farm Dams Policy 
Statement provides an example of a 200 hectare farm at Inverell, in an area with 0.07 
megalitres per hectare harvestable right being allowed dams with a volume of 14 
megalitres. Inverell has an average rainfall of about 750 millimetres — the equivalent of 
7.5 megalitres per hectare — per year.  
In Victoria, farm dams used for irrigation must be licensed. In catchments in the MDB, 
new farm dams for irrigation will only be approved if the irrigator purchases (or 
converts) an equivalent water entitlement in the same valley.   
The effect of the Victorian legislation is that building a farm dam for irrigation will be a 
costly method of obtaining irrigation water since the irrigator will have to pay both the 
capital cost of the farm dam and the water entitlement. There are several possible 
reasons why an irrigator may choose to construct a new irrigation dam. One reason 
could be that the land that they wish to irrigate is not in an irrigation district, nor close to 
an irrigation stream. Another reason could be that the dam would allow an irrigator to 
continue irrigating outside the irrigation season. Similarly, an irrigator with a licence to 
extract water in winter would need a storage dam to allow use in other seasons. A 
further reason may be that the irrigation dam might assist in improving reliability of 
supply. 
Sources: DWLC (1998); Water (Irrigation Farm Dams) Act 2002 (Victoria); GMW, pers. comm., 7 July 2004. 
     




Irrigators’ access to groundwater is subject to state government regulation aimed at 
ensuring ‘sustainable use’ of the resource. Groundwater sources can be broadly 
divided into deep and shallow resources. As a rule, deep groundwater resources 
recharge slowly (often over thousands of years) and can be considered to be a finite 
resource that can be exhausted. In Victoria, regulation aims to prevent further 
depletion by matching annual extractions to annual recharge. In contrast, many 
shallow groundwater resources recharge quickly, especially where they are 
associated with irrigation activities, and can be considered a renewable resource 
(subject to water quality issues).  
The location of a farm can determine the extent to which groundwater extraction 
may be a viable alternative source of irrigation water. For example, the expense of 
bringing a bore online is related to its depth, with deeper bores being more 
expensive to establish. Increased depth will often provide a greater reliability of 
supply. 
Changing irrigation technologies  
At the margin, an irrigator can substitute capital for water by investing in irrigation 
technologies that reduce water applications per unit of output (box 5.2 and 5.3). 
This shifts an irrigator’s long run demand curve for water since the relative value of 
water (price willing to pay) at each possible quantity demanded is changed.  
 
Box 5.2  Effects of improved irrigation efficiency 
Investment in more efficient methods of applying water or technology to reuse water 
can reduce water availability to some irrigators by reducing the ‘leakages’ in the water 
distribution system. In doing so, the return flows from users — the water that returns to 
the river system through run-off and seepage from the farm, and available to other 
users downstream — are reduced. 
Reductions in run-off can affect downstream water users since less water ends up 
flowing in drainage channels. These channels can act as an alternative water supply to 
some farmers. Consequently, an increase in irrigation efficiency by one farmer might 
limit the options for water procurement by other farmers. 
Some studies (such as Young and McColl 2003) suggest that price increases might 
increase the total water consumption of farms by leading to efficiency improvements 
without significantly reducing the volume of water purchased.  
Sources: Young and McColl (2003); de Fraiture and Perry (2002); OECD (1999).   
Irrigation technologies can differ across and within irrigation schemes. They can 
include gravity flow (flood and furrow irrigation) and pressurised systems (spray, 
micro-spray, trickle and drip systems). Each can have differing impacts on the     




environment. The choice of irrigation technology can be affected by a variety of 
factors other than the cost of water including: crop choice; location; labour costs; 
climate; and soils.  
 
Box 5.3  Irrigation application systems and water use efficiency 
Flood irrigation, commonly with laser-graded land forming, is the main method for 
irrigating pastures and broadacre crops, such as rice. Furrow irrigation is common for 
horticulture, field crops and floriculture, and also for tree and vine crops. Large to 
medium scale spray irrigation, including central pivot sprays, are used for some tree 
crops, vines, vegetables and fodder crops. Micro-spray irrigation, trickle/drip and sub-
surface drip methods are used for trees and vines. 
Water use efficiency is the proportion of applied water which is used by the plant, 
rather than percolating below the rootzone, evaporating, or becoming runoff. It is a 
measure of technical efficiency, not economic efficiency. Irrigation systems with a wide 
range of technical efficiencies could be economically efficient. For example, an 
inexpensive and technically inefficient irrigation system could be more economically 
efficient than a system which achieved greater technical efficiency at significantly 
greater cost. 
Flood and furrow irrigation tend to be less efficient in terms of water use than other 
methods. However, increased groundwater recharge from flood irrigation may result in 
greater river baseflow. Broadacre spray systems such as lateral and centre pivot 
sprays tend to be more technically efficient than flood and furrow irrigation. Micro-
spray, trickle and drip systems enable more accurate scheduling of water application, 
reducing losses to groundwater and evaporation — however, these methods are not 
suited to irrigating pasture. Other factors which influence the water use efficiency of 
different application systems include soil type, topography, wind, climate variability and 
use of irrigation scheduling methods (such as soil water monitoring). 
Sources: DNRE (2001); Raine and Foley (2002). 
 
 
The use of different irrigation technologies varies considerably between 
jurisdictions. In New South Wales and Victoria, where gravity delivery systems 
dominate, flood irrigation is by far the most common irrigation technology with 
little adoption of more technically efficient methods between 1990 and 2000 (ABS 
2003b) (table 5.1). In contrast, there was a substantial increase in the use of drip 
irrigation, with a commensurate reduction in the use of both spray and flood 
irrigation in South Australia over the same period. Nevertheless, the relatively 
larger areas of irrigation in New South Wales and Victoria compared to South 
Australia (chapter 2), mean that flood and furrow irrigation are by far the most 
widely used form of irrigation technology in the southern Murray-Darling Basin.     




Table 5.1  Distribution of irrigation technologies by State, 1990–2000 
  2000    1990 
 NSW  Vic  SA  Aust  NSW  Vic  SA  Aust
  %  %  % % %  %  %  % 
Spray  11  12  44 22 13 8  51  20 
Drip or micro  3  5  44  8  1  2  13  3 
Flood or furrow  85  82  21  70  84  90  33  74 
Other  1  —  1 1 2  —  3  3 
Source: ABS (2003b). 
Renzetti (2002) reviewed US data and found that the choice of irrigation technology 
can be affected by a variety of factors other than the cost of water. The study 
surveyed international literature on water demand, and concluded that most 
irrigation technology adoption models show that the adoption of modern irrigation 
technologies is more likely on lower quality land, when crop and input prices are 
high and when the costs of switching technologies is low. It also found: 
… the elasticity of probability of adopting modern irrigation technology with respect to 
its water cost saving is significant but small (0.028) and that farmers using groundwater 
are more likely to adopt modern technologies than those relying on surface water in 
part because suppliers of surface water have designed their conveyancing systems to 
work with traditional irrigation methods. (Renzetti 2002, pp. 9.60–63)   
In a study of the irrigation regions of Spain, Varela-Ortega et al. (1998) noted water 
demand was more responsive to prices in old irrigation schemes, where irrigation 
technologies were relatively inefficient, than in schemes where modern irrigation 
technologies had been employed. In older, gravity fed flood irrigation districts, for 
example, there are substitution possibilities within the existing flood irrigation 
technologies. Irrigators can laser grade or employ more labour or electronic sensor 
technology to monitor timing and volume of water applications as ways to improve 
use efficiency. They noted that it is misleading to characterise modern irrigation 
technologies as ‘water saving’ and that the introduction of drip irrigation will not 
guarantee water conservation. They concluded that adoption of water saving 
irrigation technology makes water demand more inelastic because it exhausts a 
substitution possibility. 
… For a given water pricing, while water savings could be achieved in old (technology) 
water districts, it is likely that no reduction in water consumption will result in modern 
(technology) districts and only farm income losses may eventuate. (Varela-Ortega et al. 
1998, p. 201) 
Similarly, in an earlier study of irrigation practices in California, Caswell and 
Zilberman (1985) found that small farm size, high water or labour costs, levels of 
rainfall, lower temperatures and soils with low water holding capacity all increase     




the likelihood of adopting sprinkler systems. They observed that drip and sprinkler 
irrigation are land augmenting technologies and can enable water sensitive crops, 
such as vine fruits, to replace less water sensitive crops, such as perennial pasture, 
on poorer soils. They found the effect of water charges on the decision to adopt 
modern irrigation technologies was not strong — raising prices four fold increased 
the probability of adopting sprinkler systems by only 0.058 per cent. 
Carey and Zilberman (2002) observe that investment in water saving technology 
tends to be driven by random events — ‘…the adoption of drip irrigation increased 
dramatically during drought periods in California’. The authors developed a 
stochastic dynamic model of the adoption of irrigation technology based on option 
value theory developed by Dixit and Pindyck. It is assumed that irrigators have the 
choice of buying water in a market instead on investing. They conclude: 
… when a farm has access to a water market, it will not invest in modern irrigation 
technology until the expected present value of investment exceeds the cost of 
investment by a potentially large hurdle rate. … The size of the hurdle rate is especially 
sensitive to the degree of uncertainty in future water prices. The greater the uncertainty, 
the larger must be the expected benefit before a farm is willing to invest. (Carey and 
Zilberman 2002, p. 181) 
Brennan (2004) argues that increasing scarcity and higher opportunity costs of 
water in Australia has probably caused many irrigators to adopt relatively 
inexpensive water saving technologies where they were available. 
Recent Australian case studies 
Two recent Australian studies by Wood et al. (2003) and Singh and Hutton (2003) 
demonstrate that: 
•  changing technologies may involve large capital costs and long pay-off periods 
•  water savings alone are unlikely to be sufficient to pay for new technology, 
particularly where powered technology replaces gravity technology 
•   changing technologies can have an impact on other aspects of the farm.  
Dairy farm conversion to centre pivot 
Wood et al. (2003) found that converting a dairy farm with flood irrigation to a 
centre pivot system would be unprofitable at utility charges of $28 per megalitre 
unless more land could be acquired cheaply and the total area under irrigation 
increased (box 5.4). The potential water savings were an important determinant of 
the viability of the project. In lighter soils (where water savings of more than two 
     




megalitres per hectare a year could be expected) the returns from the technology 
change were likely to be greater than on heavier soils where less water savings 
could be expected. Where investment was justified, the key determining factor was 
increased pasture production because of more timely applications of water, rather 
than water savings. Changing to centre pivot irrigation without purchasing 
additional land to account for lost irrigable land would only become attractive if 
water prices rose significantly (from 50 to 100 per cent, depending on assumptions). 
 
Box 5.4  A dairy farm conversion to centre pivot irrigation 
Wood et al. (2003) examined the conversion of a border-check flood irrigation system 
on a 72 hectare dairy farm to a centre-pivot spray system. The centre-pivot irrigation 
system results in 10 per cent reduction in the land that can be irrigated. The area ‘lost’ 
to production are the corners of the centre pivot as shown below — modern centre-
pivot irrigators can partially irrigate some of the corners shown, but many farms will not 










The total capital costs for the conversion were estimated to be between $240 000 to 
$280 000. The capital cost of the centre pivot was around $3800 per hectare — a 
system with the capability to irrigate about 26 hectares would cost about $100 000. 
Additional capital costs are also incurred including filling in channels, removing banks, 
connecting larger electricity mains, changes to fencing, and establishing pump stations. 
The costs of pumping water were significant, and may offset the savings in water utility 
charges from using less water. Centre pivot systems can be automated and therefore 
result in labour savings, but they are subject to the risk of mechanical failure. 
In suitable soil conditions, annual water savings of up to two megalitres per hectare 
were expected. The expected cost was about $1600 to $1850 per megalitre of water 
‘saved’ — much more than the then market price of an equivalent water right. Irrigators 
were assumed to sell the water savings, or irrigate more land. 
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Citrus orchard conversion to drip irrigation 
Singh and Hutton (2003) concluded that the conversion of a citrus orchard in the 
MIA from furrow to drip irrigation was economically viable if Navel oranges 
(which are mainly used for fresh fruit) were grown and the quality improvement 
resulted in higher prices received for fruit (box 5.5). However, the conversion was 
not justified for Valencia oranges (which are mainly used for orange juice) where 
the increased quality did not result in increased prices. The paper did not provide 
analysis to indicate how sensitive the results were to reduced water savings and it is 
not clear if the authors considered the impact of pumping costs.  
 
Box 5.5  Converting a citrus orchard to drip irrigation 
Singh and Hutton examined converting a citrus orchard from furrow to drip irrigation. 
They found that: 
•  about 70 per cent of citrus farmers ‘would need a water storage structure for 
assured water supply if they were to shift to the drip irrigation system’ 
•  changing to drip irrigation was expected to halve water use from 9 megalitres per 
year to 4.5 megalitres per year 
•  the drip system would cost about $5400 per hectare or about $100 000 per farm. 
The storage dam would cost about another $15 000 
•  drip irrigation does not increase yield, but does increase fruit quality 
•  the use of drip irrigation is likely to reduce labour requirements. 
Source: Singh and Hutton (2003). 
 
 
5.2  Long run responses in selected industries 
In this section, long run responses to rising water prices for specific irrigated 
activities are discussed. 
Rice 
In the long run, rice growers’ main responses to increased water prices are likely to 
involve technological change — such as plant varietal improvements to reduce 
water consumption. Precision irrigation technologies, including spray or drip, are 
not compatible with the semi-aquatic needs of the plant. Wider adoption of modern 
flood irrigation technology, such as raised growing beds, are also emerging as a 
technology response to water scarcity (Singh et al. 2004).     




Current research and development priorities for the rice industry include the 
development of varieties with shorter growing seasons and/or greater cold tolerance 
(Ricegrowers Association, pers. comm., 23 January 2004). For example, rice 
varieties with shorter growing seasons will tend to reduce water consumption by 
requiring a shorter period of irrigation. Rice varieties with greater cold tolerance 
will allow a lower height of water in the rice paddy, particularly at the critical time 
of flowering. The lower water height will not only reduce water usage, but also 
decrease hydraulic pressure and accessions to the water table. 
Rice growers are also likely to adopt yield enhancing technologies, such as 
precision application of fertilisers. To the extent that these technologies increase the 
profitability of growing rice, they increase the willingness of rice growers to pay 
higher prices for irrigation water. 
Some rice growers may attempt to reduce the impact of low supply reliability by 
either using facilities which allow irrigators to ‘carry-over’ part of one year’s 
seasonal allocation to the next year, and/or choosing to purchase additional 
entitlements. Irrigators in both the Murrumbidgee and Murray valleys can choose to 
consume only part of one year’s allocation of water, and carry-over the residue until 
the next irrigation season. The carry-over mechanism can enable rice growers to 
‘smooth’ variations in seasonal allocation, and hence their production of rice and 
other crops, from year to year.   
Some rice growers may choose to decrease the risk of variable seasonal allocations 
by purchasing additional entitlements. This would ensure that they would obtain 
more water in all years. In years of high allocation when available water is greater 
than average water needs, they could choose to carry over any excess, lease it, or 
plant an annual crop to use the water on-farm.  
Rice growers may also change to dryland enterprises if these enterprises are more 
profitable. The continued production of rice implies it is a relatively profitable 
enterprise for many irrigators in the Murrumbidgee and Murray valleys.  
Dairy  
Dairy farmers have a number of possible long run responses to higher water costs 
that may not involve changing irrigation technology. They include further 
investment in infrastructure to allow greater substitution of purchased fodder for 
water, changing pasture technologies (for example, changing from perennial to 
annual pastures), and using agistment or non-irrigated grazing for non-milking 
cows.     




Some dairy farmers may be able to increase the productivity of their existing 
perennial pastures, for a given application of water, by applying more fertilisers.  
Other dairy farmers may choose to further increase productivity by changing some 
of their land and other inputs to annual pastures. These productivity improvements 
would also come at the cost of additional inputs such as fertiliser, seed and labour. 
Another option for some dairy farmers could be to alter the mix of irrigated and 
non-irrigated pastures. Some dairy farmers already have access to areas of 
non-irrigated pastures for feeding ‘dry’ cows. Further access to non-irrigated land 
could be obtained by converting existing irrigated pastures, purchasing, leasing or 
renting non-irrigated land, or by agistment. Some irrigators may choose to grow 
annual, rather than perennial, pastures on non-irrigated land. 
The more opportunities that are available for dairy producers to move away from 
water intensive production methods, the more responsive their demand for irrigation 
water will be as the price of water rises. 
Perennial horticulture 
Irrigators of perennial horticultural crops tend to have more irrigation technologies 
available because individual vines or trees are planted in a series of rows. They can 
include spray irrigation and drip irrigation (including fertigation) which is widely 
used on high value crops. Increased water prices may influence the decision to 
invest in new horticultural plantations, but may have little impact on water demand 
from existing plantations with sunk capital costs. 
For some horticultural crops (such as grapes) there can be problems with using 
spray irrigation technologies because watering the plant from above wets both the 
leaves and the fruit, resulting in potential for crop damage through fungus. Further, 
spray irrigation normally results in higher losses through transpiration and 
evaporation than if water is delivered directly to root systems using drip irrigation. 
However, some spray irrigation systems can provide an additional benefit of 
providing frost protection, for a relatively small increase in capital outlays. This 
may influence the choice of irrigation systems for some frost sensitive crops. 
However, high water application rates are required. The Western Australian 
Department of Agriculture (2004) suggests application rates of between 2.5 and 
3.5 mm per hour, or over 0.25 megalitres per hectare for 10 hours protection. The 
Department notes higher water rates may be applied but that the higher water run-
off can lead to vineyard management issues such as waterlogging, poor drainage, 
poor trafficability and inefficient use of water and power (Western Australian 
Department of Agriculture 2004).      




As discussed earlier, it is unlikely that the savings from water alone will be a 
sufficient incentive for adopting new irrigation technology. However, water saving 
technology may be adopted where there are associated productivity and quality 
gains, cost savings in other areas, or if the price of water were to increase. In the 
wine-grape industry, adoption of water saving technologies can produce premium 
grapes — of higher value due to their concentrated juices and higher quality for 
wine making.  
In contrast to investment in irrigation technology, the decision to invest in new 
horticultural plantations may be more sensitive to expected higher water prices. 
There is likely to be an inverse relationship between the capital intensity of a 
prospective horticultural investment and responses to increased water prices. If a 
prospective investment has relatively low capital costs, the response to expected 
higher water prices may be elastic. However, as capital intensity increases and the 
relative cost share of water decreases, the response to expected higher water prices 
may become more inelastic. 
5.3   Summing  up 
•  Regulations governing the harvesting of surface and groundwater mean that the 
total volume of water available for use by irrigators is unlikely to increase 
substantially over existing harvesting entitlements. 
•  A substitute for additional water purchases is to invest in more efficient 
irrigation application systems. Recent Australian case studies indicate that water 
savings alone may not justify investment in water saving technologies. However, 
associated productivity and quality gains may make such investments profitable. 
•  Water savings from improved technologies depend on soil types. Changing 
technologies have an impact on other aspects of the farm, and may lead to 
increased production and/or labour savings. However, changing from gravity to 
pressurised systems may increase irrigation costs due to high pumping costs. 
•  Changing technologies may involve large capital costs and long pay-off periods. 
•  In the long run, rice growers’ responses to increased water prices are likely to 
involve technological change such as plant varietal improvement to reduce water 
consumption. 
•  Dairy farmers’ responses to increased water prices include substituting other 
inputs, such as fertiliser, purchased fodder, pasture varieties or non-irrigated land 
for irrigated pastures. 
•  Increased water prices will influence the decision to develop new perennial 
horticultural plantations, but may have little impact on water demand from 
existing plantations.     




6  Other long run responses 
In this chapter, more general long run responses to, and impacts of, changes in 
water prices are considered. In the long run, all inputs are variable including the 
amount and location of land owned and capital employed. Possible constraints on 
long run decision making are briefly described in section 6.1. This is followed by a 
discussion of the likely impact of changing water prices on the price of water 
entitlements and land.  
6.1  Long run decision making 
In the long run, irrigators have further options to respond to higher prices and 
charges for irrigation water. They can exit from agriculture, or change the mixture 
of all outputs and all inputs to achieve an enterprise that meets their financial and 
personal needs. Even if an irrigator leaves agriculture, the land will not remain idle. 
The new owner will make decisions about which mixture of outputs and inputs will 
meet their financial and personal needs.  
Long run responses involve evaluating a series of investment options. From an 
economic perspective, the irrigator’s objective is to maximise long run profits, 
subject to a number of important economic constraints and other objectives. 
Irrigators will respond to changes in relative prices received for outputs and paid for 
inputs. They will respond to changing climatic conditions, environmental 
expectations, technological innovation and international economic conditions.  
Changes in the price of irrigated water are only one factor in any long run changes 
in irrigated agriculture. Changes in farming systems will occur because of: changes 
in consumer tastes; climatic changes that influence the quantity of irrigation water 
made available or the growth of plants; advances in irrigation or other technologies; 
unforeseeable factors such as disease outbreaks; and other reasons. For 
internationally traded commodities, international developments in each of these 
areas may be as important as developments in Australia.     




6.2 Changing  outputs 
If water prices increase, some irrigators may find that their current mix of activities 
is still the most profitable mix for their farm in the long run. Other irrigators may 
find that even a small increase in the long-term price, or expected price, of irrigation 
water changes the relative profitability of the activities available to them, and will 
choose to change activities and outputs. This can in turn affect commodity prices 
(box 6.1).  
Constraints on changing outputs 
Those irrigators who perceive that changing outputs may be more profitable in the 
long run may be subject to a number of constraints affecting their decisions. For 
example, physical constraints, including the topography of the farm, soil types, 
water availability and climate, affect irrigators’ responses in the long run. On any 
farm, some activities will be more appropriate than others. Farms with undulating 
topography, for example, may not be suited to gravity irrigation technologies.  
The ease with which farmers can move to different activities, or reduce the 
proportion of water intensive crops in crop systems, will affect the long run demand 
for irrigation water. If significant amounts of infrastructure are required to switch to 
other crops, this lack of flexibility could lead to less elastic demand for water. Some 
farming systems require ‘lumpy’ capital infrastructure. For example, dairy farmers 
have large fixed infrastructure, such as milk harvesting and cattle feeding systems, 
which might be redundant (although some may be salvageable) if the irrigator 
switches to an alternative farming system. Similarly, some irrigated crops, such as 
tree fruits and vines with long pre-productive periods tend to have large start-up 
costs compared to annual crops. Farms with existing perennial horticultural 
plantations may also face high costs of clearing the land for alternative activities.  
Existing farm infrastructure may also influence the choices of some irrigators. 
Many farms have infrastructure specific to the activities undertaken on the farm, 
such as dairies and rice paddies. If the profits from an activity decline, the irrigator 
may continue to undertake that activity because the costs of the infrastructure are 
sunk. The irrigator maximises long run profits by continuing the activity and 
utilising the asset even though current profit levels would not justify new 
investment. Expected future profits from the activity and use of the infrastructure 
would have to decline below expected future profits from alternatives before it was 
abandoned (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). An investment may also be abandoned when 
the expected salvage value exceeds the expected net benefits from continued use of 
the asset (Edwards 1959). Should the irrigator decide to change activities or adopt     




new technology, capital outlays of many thousands of dollars per hectare, and 
hundreds of thousands of dollars per farm, may be required. 
 
Box 6.1  Impacts on commodity prices 
In the long run, prices received by irrigators are variable, and will change because of 
farmers responses to changing circumstances. The long run price of an output in 
competitive industries should cover total long run average costs, and also provide a 
‘normal’ profit to the irrigator. Consequently, any significant decrease in long run costs 
will eventually be passed on to the consumer. 
In some industries, the long run responses to prices can be slow and difficult to see. 
This may particularly be the case in industries where a substantial portion of production 
is exported, such as the dairy industry.  
The wine grape industry is an example of an industry that appears to follow a cyclical 
behaviour of price and quantity. Initial high after-tax returns led to substantial 
investment, both within Australia and overseas. After a number of years, this led to a 
significant increase in domestic and world production, with a subsequent decline in 
prices received.  
When considering irrigators’ long run responses to increased water prices, it should be 
remembered that if a large number of irrigators choose to move from one activity to 
another, the change may affect commodity prices received in both the industry they 
leave (prices may rise) and the one they enter (prices may fall).  
Source: Douglas, Dwyer and Peterson (2004). 
 
 
The type of tenure for land may be another factor influencing the ability of some 
irrigators to change activities (where change to the infrastructure of the farm is 
required). Irrigators who lease land may be reluctant to invest in new infrastructure 
unless they can capture sufficient benefits of their investment. 
The reliability of supply of irrigation water is an important constraint in determining 
what activities an irrigator can choose from. A relatively low supply reliability is 
more likely to influence irrigators to adopt opportunity cropping activities. It 
provides the flexibility to match their annual plantings with the annual expected 
supply of irrigation water. In some cases, they may decide not to plant in years 
when small seasonal allocations are expected. On the other hand, a relatively high 
supply reliability may encourage investment in perennial crops and reduce annual 
cropping. There is a need to gain a greater understanding of the interaction between 
supply reliability of irrigation water and maximising the economic benefits from all 
resources available to the irrigator, including (but not only) water. 
A further constraint to the selection of alternative activities may be access to 
markets and associated infrastructure. For example, producing vegetables close to     




markets provides access to markets for fresh produce and reduces transport costs. 
Similarly, it may be difficult to undertake an enterprise in an area lacking necessary 
infrastructure to process the produce.  
Potential tax liabilities may also provide a constraint where the cessation of one 
enterprise triggers a contingent tax liability. This is most likely to occur in self-
replacing dairy herds where the tax value of a herd may be much less than the 
market value. Selling part, or all, of the herd may trigger a tax liability, reducing the 
amount of money available to fund alternative investments. Similarly, enterprise 
changes which involve selling part, or all, of the water entitlement may result in 
capital gains tax liabilities. 
The availability of labour and management may provide a constraint to some 
mixtures of activities. For example, some activity mixes may allow the use of 
available labour and management evenly over a production season. Changing to an 
alternative activity mix may require larger or smaller inputs of labour and 
management at certain times of the year. Shortages of labour and management at 
certain times may constrain the irrigator’s choice of that activity.  
An irrigator’s skills may be an important constraint. For example, a grape-grower 
may need to develop new skills to become an efficient dairy farmer, or vice versa. 
Even more broadly, a farm family’s ability to respond can be affected by their 
values, goals, financial position, and desire to remain on the land. Inevitably, this 
means that there will be considerable variation between land users. While many 
farm families seek to maximise their financial welfare, other factors — such as a 
desire for lifestyle and minimising risk — can be important. 
Age may also be important. ABARE (2003) estimates that around 99 per cent of 
farm businesses are run by owner-managers. The 1996-97 ABARE survey of New 
South Wales irrigators reports an average age of 53 years, 3 years younger than the 
average age of all New South Wales farmers. The average age of irrigators is older 
than the general workforce. Older irrigators without bequest motives, or those 
planning to retire, may have a relatively short investment horizon. A short 
investment horizon may make some older irrigators reluctant to invest in activities 
with long pay-off periods, and where it was perceived that the cost of the 
investment may not be fully realised if the enterprise was sold prior to reaching full 
production. 
Changing the area of the farm 
A response to increased water prices, and changes in outputs, may be to change the 
area of land farmed. This, in turn, affects land prices (box 6.2). For example,     




suppose an irrigator responds to higher water prices by changing to a high value-
added activity. The irrigator may sell some land and farm the remaining area more 
intensively. In some cases, the sale of ‘excess’ land may fund the change to the new 
activity. 
 
Box 6.2  Impacts on land prices 
Part of the long run response to changing water prices will be changing factor prices, in 
particular for land and water entitlements. Land within an irrigation area normally 
attracts a higher price than similar land just outside the irrigation area. However, some 
caution is needed in interpreting the differential. 
Even if the land outside an irrigation area has identical fertility and physical 
characteristics to the land within an irrigation area, they may not be perfectly 
interchangeable. This is because the land within an irrigation area has access to the 
irrigation distribution system. Industry consultations revealed that dryland properties at 
the periphery of irrigation schemes in the southern MDB have increased in value by 
around $2000 per hectare upon gaining access to the distribution system. These 
increases in value have occurred despite the properties not having any on-farm 
irrigation infrastructure nor a water entitlement (GMW, pers. comm., 8 July 2004). 
Possible explanations for farmers paying a premium for land with access to an 
irrigation distribution system include:  
•  Irrigated agriculture is less subject to climatic risk than other agriculture. Other 
factors being equal, the prices of factors of production of a less risky activity should 
be higher than the factors of production of a more risky activity. 
•  Irrigated agriculture may be perceived to be more profitable than dryland agriculture. 
However, given that irrigated activities are normally capital-intensive activities, it 
may be difficult to determine what portion of any additional profitability is a premium 
to irrigation rather than a return on capital. 
Further, irrigated land normally has structural improvements that make it suitable for 
irrigated activities, such as dairies and various types of irrigation systems, ranging from 
drip to flood irrigation. These structural improvements should account for part of the 
observed price differential. 
While the determinants of the price of rural land are complex, the potential profitability 
of the activities that can be carried out on that land is undoubtedly a factor. It follows 
that any change that reduces the long run profitability of irrigated activities could lead 
to a fall in the price of that land. 
 
 
Other irrigators may respond to increased water prices by changing their production 
mix to include more non-irrigated agricultural activities, and fewer irrigated 
activities. Non-irrigated agricultural activities tend to be more land-intensive than 
irrigated activities, and it may become necessary to  acquire more land to achieve a 
farm size that is likely to provide sufficient financial returns to meet their family 
goals.     




Yet other irrigators may respond to increased water prices by pursuing greater 
economies of size from their existing activity. For example, it is possible that some 
irrigators who adopt water saving technologies may use the water ‘saved’ to irrigate 
more land. This could mean that they have to purchase the land. 
Buying and selling water entitlements 
If irrigators respond to changing water prices by changing outputs, it is possible that 
their initial water entitlement will be inappropriate for their new activities. 
Impacts on the price of water entitlements 
As irrigators respond to changing prices for seasonal allocations, the value of water 
entitlements may also be affected. This is because the price of water entitlements is, 
in part, a function of the expected price of traded allocations, holding costs, and the 
expected residual value of the entitlement at the end of the investment horizon.  
The impact on the price of water entitlements may depend on which price of what 
type of water increases, with the potential for very different impacts. For example, 
assume a water utility substantially increases its delivery charges, and it is expected 
that this increase is permanent. At the margin, this should mean that some low 
value-added activities will be reduced or cease, while the benefits from new 
investment into irrigated activities may be reduced. Incentives for investment in 
water saving technology should increase. Initially, such responses could lead to 
more water entitlements being offered for sale, reducing price. In the longer run, the 
higher utility charge should reduce the price paid for traded allocations, again 
leading to the reduction in the price of water entitlements. 
In contrast, if there are no changes in utility charges, but there is an exogenous 
increase in prices for traded allocations, this should make entitlements more 
attractive to hold as an investment.  
Converting from irrigated to non-irrigated farming 
Some irrigators may respond to changing water prices and economic circumstances 
by ceasing irrigation activities and undertaking non-irrigated activities (box 6.3). 
Converting a farm from irrigated activities to dryland activities means not only 
changing outputs and the physical inputs to the crops produced, but also changing 
the mixture of the capital and labour employed on the farm. For example, some 
dairy farmers in the GMW district have changed to dryland livestock production 
and sold their water entitlement. The sale of the water entitlement provided cash.     




There may also be a cashflow advantage when selling a dairy herd and purchasing 
other livestock. After allowing for taxes, the cash could be used to retire debt, or 
fund investments both on and off the farm.  
 
Box 6.3 Sale  of  irrigated  land and water entitlement — is the whole 
more than the sum of the parts? 
Separation of water entitlements from land means irrigators can sell their water 
entitlement without selling the farm. However, there are suggestions that selling an 
irrigation farm with an adequate water entitlement may result in a higher overall price 
than selling the two assets separately (Bjornlund 2001).  
Most farms are not sold on a ‘walk-in walk-out’ basis where the land, livestock, plant 
and other farming assets are sold as one package. Rather, the land is sold, and then 
there is a public ‘clearing sale’ where the livestock, plant and moveable assets are 
sold. As a water entitlement is a moveable asset, it could be expected to achieve its 
highest price at a public auction, such as a ‘clearing sale’.  
Examination of advertisements for the sale of irrigation farms shows that the two 
assets (land and water entitlement) continue to be advertised as a package in most 
cases. This implies that either the sale of the farm and water entitlement as one unit is 
perceived to result in a higher overall return than the sale of the two assets separately, 
or that there may be additional transaction costs in selling land and water separately.  
There are several explanations for the possible differential: 
•  The market for water entitlements is relatively ‘thin’ — there are few trades 
observed. A purchaser buying a land and water entitlement package can be certain 
of their total investment. However, an intending irrigator who purchases land only 
will have to attempt to purchase water entitlements in a market where there may be 
few sellers. A pessimistic purchaser could over-estimate the cost of purchasing 
water entitlements, and therefore reduce the price they may be prepared to offer for 
land. 
•  An irrigation farm sold with an adequate water entitlement is a functioning farm. As 
such, the farm may be valued as a ‘going concern’, including irrigation and related 
infrastructure. On the other hand, an irrigation farm sold without a water entitlement 
cannot function as an irrigation farm, and prospective purchasers may discount the 
value of the irrigation and related infrastructure (Bjornlund 2001).  
•  The demand for water on some irrigation channels is close to the supply capacity of 
the channel. If an irrigator leaving the industry sold their water entitlement to other 
irrigators on the same channel, the purchaser of the land could then have difficulty 
obtaining capacity on that channel, even though they could purchase a water 
entitlement. Conversely, there are some channels where there is little demand for 
water. The sale of an entitlement from such a channel may make it uneconomic for 
a utility to continue operating the channel. Once a channel is closed, it may be 
costly to reopen. 
 
     





•  In the long run, prices received in competitive industries are expected to cover 
long run average costs, including a ‘normal’ profit to owners of the business. 
Consequently, any significant decrease in long run costs will eventually be 
passed on to the consumer. 
•  In the long run, some irrigators will respond to increased water prices by 
changing outputs. Physical constraints to changing outputs include the 
topography of the farm, soil types, water availability, and climate. Other 
constraints may include capital availability, type of tenure for land, the supply 
reliability of irrigation water, access to markets and regional infrastructure, and 
taxation. 
•  If a large number of irrigators move from one activity to another, the change 
may affect commodity prices received in both the activity they leave (prices may 
go higher) and the one they enter (prices may go lower).  
•  While the determinants of the price of rural land are complex, the potential 
profitability of the activities that can be carried out on that land are an important 
factor. Any change that reduces the long run profitability of irrigated activities 
will tend to reduce the price of that land.  
 
APPENDIX     





A Previous  Australian  estimation 
studies 
Many studies have estimated the demand for water, in a number of different 
contexts. This appendix discusses a number of studies from Australia that are 
primarily concerned with the demand for irrigation water. 
Estimates of the derived demand for irrigation water are based on the value of water 
as an input into agricultural production. This value is dependent on the value of the 
agricultural output, and hence the estimation process gives a schedule that 
represents the value of the marginal product for water. 
There is considerable variation among the approaches used to estimate water 
demand. Among the most significant differences are: 
•  the scale of the optimising decision maker (either relatively homogeneous sub-
regions or individual farms) 
•  the time horizon (short, medium or long run models). 
Models also differ on the geographic region on which the analysis takes place. The 
region considered will determine the dominant agricultural industries. 
The irrigation water demand relationships that have been estimated by nine different 
studies are compared in table A.1 by the own-price elasticity of water that were 
observed. All the studies are on regions within the Murray-Darling Basin. 
In all cases it was found that demand is very inelastic at low prices. In fact, the 
majority of studies estimated that demand was (nearly) perfectly inelastic for prices 
from $0 to $20 or $55 per megalitre. This means that, for price rises within these 
ranges, the quantity of irrigation water used will not change. 
The responsiveness (elasticity) of demand increased for higher price levels. Those 
studies that reported elasticities over a number of price ranges all found this 
increase, to the extent that most water demand functions where found to be elastic 
(greater than 1) at the highest price range considered.     





Table A.1  Elasticities from various models of irrigated water demand 
Study reference  Observed own-price elasticity (ε)  Price range for ε 0 
TERM-Water 
(PC estimates using Wittwer 2003) 
short run:    -0.08 




Hall (2003)  linear: $0–$100  -0.11 
quadratic: $0–$100  -0.14 
 
Jayasuriya, Crean and Hannah (2001)   $0–$38  -0.02 
 $38–$47  -0.72 
 $47–$77  -0.82 
 $77–$98  -3.52 
$0–$37 
Pagan et al. (1997)  short run:  $10–$30  -0.03 
 $30–$50  -0.19 
 $50–$70  -2.81 
long run:  $10–$30  -0.04 
 $30–$50  -0.25 
 $50–$70  -3.01 
$0–$40 
Collins, Hall and Scoccimarro (1996) 
 
 $0–$28  0.00 
 $28–$38  -0.14 
 $38–$50  -0.20 
$0–$28 





 $20–$80  -0.99  $0–$20 
Mallawaarachchi, Hall and Phillips (1992) 
 
 
 $12–$37  -0.34  na 





short run:  $0–$55  0.00 
 $55–$70  -1.15 
medium run:  $0–$55  0.00 
 $55–$70  -1.65 
$0–$55 




 $4–$21  -0.13 
 $21–$42  -0.65 
 $42–$51  -3.80 
 $52–$58  -14.1 
$0–$20 
a Where elasticities were not explicitly presented within a study, they were calculated from the reported 
demand functions.     






Table A.1 (continued) 
    Region / Industries  Comments 
 
 
Irrigated industries in the 
southern Murray-Darling Basin 
•  Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of Australia 
examining regional impacts using ABS statistical divisions 
in the Murray-Darling Basin, and remaining states. 
 
 
  •  Linear and quadratic programming models of irrigated 





Lachlan Valley (NSW)   •  Based on NSW Agriculture existing regional economic 
model of irrigated agriculture 







Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area / 
onions, carrots, rice, wheat, 
soybeans, canola, lucerne and 
sub-clover; with long run 
opportunities in winegrapes 
•  Parametric linear programming model of region 
•  Short run — capital constrained 
•  Long run — may involve adoption of new (water saving) 
irrigation technologies (on-farm storage and drainage reuse 
systems) and/or new enterprises requiring significant 
capital investment such as permanent horticulture 
 Southern  Murray-Darling  Basin  •  No interregional trading 
•  Short run estimates 
•  Water demand is more elastic if output prices fall. 
  Southern Murray-Darling Basin / 
rice, tree and vine crops, and 
pastures for dairy and prime 
lamb production (cotton in one 
region) 
•  Spatial equilibrium model, linking 18 regional linear 
programming sub-models by a model of the river system. 
•  Short run — no incorporation of capital (or structural) 
adjustment in response to rising water prices. 
  Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area / 
citrus and wine grape 
•  Programming model of a farm 
•  Long run — 20 year time horizon, for behaviour of 
investment in water saving irrigation technology 
  Northern Victoria – Goulburn 
and Murray irrigation systems 
•  14 relatively homogeneous sub-regions, each assumed to 
be managed as a single profit-maximising entity, under 
hypothetical ‘average’ climatic conditions 
•  Short run — breeding livestock and capital constrained 





Murrumbidgee and Coleambally 
Irrigation Areas / 36 cropping 
(27 irrigated, 9 dryland) and 8 
livestock activities 
•  Regional Linear programming model 
•  Short run — capital constrained, but water use may change 
through alternative cropping patterns and varying the 
number of irrigations per crop 
     




A longer time horizon also increases the responsiveness of water demand. The two 
studies that permitted flexibility in farm decision making by allowing changes in the 
numbers of breeding stock (medium run) or investment in new irrigation capital 
(long run). This is because the longer time horizon provides more options with 
which to address the rising price of water, and thus more avenues to decrease 
consumption of this costly resource (box A.1).  
 
Box A.1  Long run and short run modelling 
Pagan et al. (1997) conducted a study to compare long run and short run models of 
irrigation water demand. Parametric linear programming and ordinary least squares 
regression analysis were conducted over a $0 to $70 per megalitre price range, to 
determine demand relationships in an unregulated market. They built on the model of 
Jones and Fagan (1996) which functions at the region level, for the Murrumbidgee 
Irrigation Area — Yanco and Mirrool Irrigation Areas, centred on Leeton and Griffith 
respectively. 
The model seeks to maximise the regional financial gross margin from cropping and 
pasture. Crops include onions, carrots, rice, wheat, soybeans and canola, while 
lucerne and sub-clover are used for grazing sheep or hay production and sale. This 
maximisation occurs subject to crop and livestock price data (three-year farm-gate 
averages) and variable cost and yield data from previous Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area 
evaluations specified for different farm types. 
In the long run model, farmers may adopt new (water saving) irrigation technologies 
such as on-farm storage and drainage reuse systems, and/or new enterprises requiring 
significant capital investment such as permanent horticulture — these are all 
adjustment opportunities that are beyond a farm’s short run resources. Perennial 
horticultural crops are represented by wine grape plantings that require high security 
water entitlements. Such entitlements are sold at a premium. 
Responsiveness of water demand was found to be less elastic in the more constrained 
situations since not all adjustment options are considered. 
     
A notable characteristic of the estimated demand functions is their stepwise form. 
These steps arise because reductions in water use usually occur at threshold prices 
where a farmer is induced to change a discrete variable such as the choice of 
irrigation technology or the mix of crops. 
Existing models were based on a yearly time frame and use average statistics for 
rainfall. This type of research hides the seasonal variation that water demand 
experiences throughout stages of crop development or other agricultural processes. 
It also masks the effect that uncertainty of rainfall can play on farmer decision 
making. In addition, as Hall, Poulter and Curtotti (1994) noted, where price and 
water flows are considered to be known with certainty in models, water security 
cannot be considered.     
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